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Abstract
This dissertation uses experimental evidence to explore the effects of overconfidence on economic
decision making. In Chapter 1 I provide experimental evidence of the effects of alcohol on
overconfidence and several other important tasks. I also explore the relationship between
overconfidence and the behavior in the other tasks. The data from this experiment show that an
alcohol level of 0.08 does not have a systemic effect on behavior and more importantly it does not
affect ones level of overconfidence. I also show that overconfidence is not significantly correlated
with risk preferences, math, strategic behavior, anchoring, altruism, and food choices. In Chapter
2 I use feedback to establish a causal link between overconfidence and trading behavior.
Feedback is used to eliminate the possibility for subjects to be overconfident about the accuracy
of their signals. The data from this experiment show that overconfidence affects trading volume
and profits, but when feedback is provided trading volume is no longer affected by
overconfidence. This shows that there exists a causal relationship between overconfidence and
trading volume. Lastly, Chapter 3 explores the role of overconfidence on insurance purchasing
decisions. I show that overconfident people buy significantly less insurance. The stability of
overconfidence using different measures and the relationship between overconfidence and risk is
also explored. I find that different tasks do not elicit the same level of overconfidence and that risk
preferences and overconfidence are not statistically significantly correlated.
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Introduction

This dissertation provides experimental evidence of the role of overconfidence on economic
decision making. The dissertation is divided into three chapters. The first chapter explores the
effect of alcohol on economic decision making. This chapter also explores the relationship
between overconfidence and each of the other tasks employed in this experiment. The second
chapter uses feedback to establish a causal relationship between overconfidence and trading
behavior. In addition to this, I explore the role of feedback on overconfidence and information
aggregation. The last chapter explores the role of overconfidence on the decision to purchase
insurance. This chapter ties with the first two chapters in that it also provides additional evidence
of the relationship of overconfidence and risk preferences and it explores the stability of
overconfidence measures by using two different methods to elicit overconfidence.
The first chapter of this dissertation report the results of an experiment where half of the subjects
were treated with alcohol and the other half were not. We explore the effect of alcohol on
overconfidence, risk preferences, math, strategic behavior, altruism, food choices and anchoring.
We find that alcohol has no systemic effects, which stands in stark contrast to the cognitive load
results by Deck and Jahedi (2015) who find subjecting to increased cognitive load led to more
impulsive decisions. As part of this dissertation I also explore the relationship between
overconfidence and each of the other tasks listed above. The most important relationship is the
relationship of risk taking and overconfidence, for which there is conflicting evidence in the
literature. Some research relates overconfidence with lower perceptions of risk (Busenitz and
Barney 1997; Palich and Badgy 1995; and Russo and Schoemaker 1992) while other
experimental research finds no effect of overconfidence on risk taking (Hardies et al., 2013). The
1

findings of this chapter are similar to Hardies et al. (2013) in that we do not find statistically
significant results for any of the risk measures. There is no statistically significant relationship
between overconfidence and risk or any of the other tasks employed here.
The second chapter of this dissertation concentrates on establishing a causal link between
overconfidence and trading behavior. Both theoretical and empirical research argue that
overconfidence affects trading behavior (Odean, 1998; Gervais and Odean, 2001; Deaves et al.,
2008; Barber and Odean; 2000, Glaser and Weber, 2007; and Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2009). Yet,
the literature to date has not established a clean causal relationship between overconfidence and
trading behavior. In this experiment I use a three condition experimental design to establish this
causal relationship. In the baseline condition subjects can be overconfident then in the other two
conditions I eliminate overconfidence to capture any changes on trading behavior. I find that
trading volume and profits are no longer affected by overconfidence once feedback is provided. In
addition to this, I explore the effect of feedback on overconfidence and the information
aggregation in each condition. I find that feedback does not improve calibration and that markets
aggregate information only when subjects know the accuracy of their information.
The last chapter is designed to establish a causal relationship between overconfidence and the
decision to purchase insurance. In this chapter subjects insure earnings in three different
treatments. In the first treatment subjects do not know the probability of loss, but know that it
depends on their performance on a trivia task. In the second and third treatments subjects know
the probability of loss. Treatments one and two are designed to be identical with the exception of
the information subjects have about the probability of loss. Hence, if overconfidence plays a role
on insurance decision making one would expect to see different behavior in treatments one and
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two. As predicted, overconfident subjects purchase statistically significantly less insurance in the
first treatment but not in the second treatment. This is to the best of my knowledge the first study
to establish a causal link between overconfidence and insurance decision making. The third
treatment was a manipulation check that varied the probability of loss to explore if subjects
respond to changes in the probability loss.
This dissertation contributes to the literature on overconfidence in several important ways. First, I
provide experimental evidence of the effect of alcohol on overconfidence and the relationship
between overconfidence and the behavior on other economically relevant tasks. Second, the
dissertation sheds more light on the relationship of overconfidence and trading behavior which is
one of the most studied effects of overconfidence to date. Third, I provide experimental evidence
of a causal relationship between overconfidence and the decision to purchase insurance. Fourth,
the data from the last chapter of this dissertation are used to improve our understanding of
overconfidence in two important ways. There is no agreement in the literature of overconfidence
on what is the best way to elicit overconfidence. I show that different elicitation methods may
lead to different results and I discuss how this changes the interpretation of results in the chapter
two. I also explore the relationship between two measures of overconfidence and two risk
measures. I do not find any statistically significant relationship among both overconfidence
measure and the two risk measures.

3

2

Chapter 1

The Effects of Alcohol Use on Economic Decision Making

Abstract
In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision
making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We
investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math,
uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results
indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for
the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the
choices of male and female subjects. In addition to this the relationship between overconfidence
and the performance in math, uncertainty, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism is
explored. The results reveal no significant relationship between overconfidence and the
performance in any of these tasks.

4

2.1

Introduction

Alcohol is the most commonly abused substance in the US (SAMHSA Report, 2014) and
problems arising from its misuse are estimated to cost $249 billion annually (Sacks et al., 2015).
The health risks from alcohol are well-recognized: alcohol-related deaths are the fourth leading
preventable cause of death in the United States (Stahre et al., 2014), alcohol is harmful during
pregnancy, and it is responsible for nearly half of all liver disease deaths annually (Yoon et al.,
2014). While the social and economic costs of alcohol consumption are established, less is known
about the effects of alcohol on economic decision making.
Alcohol is generally assumed to increase risk-taking and impulsive decision making. However,
given the nature of consumption, it is also quite challenging to establish causal relationships
between alcohol and many socio-economic consequences. Many of the alcohol studies to date use
survey data to compare behavior of people who abuse alcohol to those who do not. While being
informative, interpretation of these studies can be difficult. One big problem is selection bias:
people who abuse alcohol may differ fundamentally in their base levels of risk-taking and
impatience. Any reported differences between the two groups may be due in part to initial
differences in traits or behaviors. Another big problem is that it is hard to disentangle the effects
of alcohol from the context in which drinking takes place. People may choose to drink at
moments when they wish to act silly, or let their guard down.
In this study we use a controlled laboratory setting to study the effect of alcohol on economic
decision making. The use of random assignment in the lab allows us to overcome the standard
limitations and identify causal relationships. We collected data on 82 subjects randomly assigned
to either a control treatment or to an alcohol treatment. People in the control group drink tonic
5

water in a cup that contains trace amounts of alcohol, whereas those in the alcohol treatment drink
tonic water with an amount of vodka expected to result in their BAC reaching the 0.08 level. All
subjects are then asked to complete a battery of 59 questions involving a variety of tasks common
to economic experiments including: math problems, decisions involving risk, overconfidence
tasks, anchoring tasks, snack choice tasks, coordination games, and games measuring altruism.
We explore how being treated with alcohol affects people’s behavior in these tasks.
Most of the research relating alcohol consumption and economic decision making has been
concentrated on how alcohol affects risk taking behavior in individuals. Given the seemingly
large importance of risk in the literature, our study explores different types of risk-taking,
including higher-order risk preferences such as prudence and temperance. Our study also
examines other important economic tasks, with a focus on tasks that have been used in previous
cognitive disruption studies as well as alcohol studies (Deck and Jahedi, 2015; Corazzini et al.,
2015). In this sense, our paper is complementary to other papers that have jointly examined how a
host of biases are impacted by depleted cognitive resources. A priori, we expected that the effects
of alcohol would closely mimic those of cognitive load because both would serve to interfere with
the ability of the brain’s reasoning System 2 to control the brain’s impulsive System 1 (see
Kahneman 2002, 2011). Our main result is that alcohol consumption has little systematic impact
on economic decision making. This stands in stark contrast to the cognitive load results by Deck
and Jahedi (2015) who find that subjecting increased cognitive load led to more impulsive
decisions, consistent with a dual system model. The result that memorizing a large number
impacts decision making more than having a BAC of 0.08 is surprising, yet important.
In addition, the relationship between overconfidence and the performance in all the other tasks is
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studied. While there have been a lot of studies on overconfidence there is still little understood
about the relationship between overconfidence and other behaviors or preferences. The most
important relationship to be explored is that between risk and overconfidence. Risk and
overconfidence can play opposite role in many markets. For instance, consider a market entry
situation. A risk averse person will be less willing to enter the market while if this same person is
overconfident about her ability to do well in the market she will be more willing to enter. Hence,
better understanding this relationship is very important. In addition to this, the dataset from this
experiment allows one to explore other relationships that can help improve our understanding of
overconfidence.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We look at the literature in Section 2.2 and
present our experimental design and procedures in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4 we present the
results and conclude in the last section with a discussion of the main findings.

2.2

Literature Review

Alcohol has been associated with a wide range of negative consequences that do not only affect
the individuals who consume alcohol, but also can have externalities on others. Social scientists
have developed a vast area of research on the impact of alcohol consumption in human behavior.
Previous research has shown that alcohol is connected with traffic fatalities (Dee, 1999; Levitt and
Porter, 2001; Cohen et al. 2002; Hingson et al. 2005) and increased crime rates (Gerson and
Preston, 1979; Murdoch and Ross, 1990; Campbell et al. 2009).1 In part these results may be
1

Alcohol consumption is also associated with high school drop-out rates (Wichstorm, 1998;
Chatterji and Desimone, 2005; Chatterji and Desimone, 2006, Townsend et al., 2007; and Singleton and Wolfson 2009), poor sleeping behavior (Singleton and Wolfson, 2009), and worse health
conditions (Klatsky et al., 1977; Hoffemeister et al., 1999; Howland et al., 2010; Neufeld and
7

driven by alcohol consumption causing people to alter their basic economic preferences such as
how they view risk and altruism.
Corazzini et al. (2015) study the effect of alcohol on risk and altruism as well as optimism, time
preferences, and willingness to pay in a controlled laboratory setting. Their study, which is the
most similar to ours, uses three treatments to separate the pharmacological and psychological
effects of alcohol. In their first experiment, no reference was made to alcohol, while in the second
experiment, participants knew whether they might be served alcohol. In the second experiment
half of the participants were given alcohol while the other half were given a non-alcoholic drink
that smelled of alcohol. Our paper is similar to the second experiment of Corazzini et al. (2015)
as we examine the causal effect of alcohol consumption on seven tasks: math, uncertainty,
overconfidence, strategic games, food choices, anchoring, and altruism.
Other studies investigating the effects of alcohol consumption on basic economic decision making
tend to be more focused on specific behaviors. For example, Schilbach (2015) focuses on
self-control using a field study. He finds that financial incentives can be used to discourage
drinking which in turn leads to more willingness to save. With respect to risk, Barsky et al.
(1995), Anderson and Mellor (2008) and Galizzi and Miraldo (2012) all provide evidence of
negative correlation between risk aversion and alcohol consumption in field data. However,
Burghart et al. (2013) find that alcohol makes women more risk averse than men for low levels of
BAC but that their tolerance towards risk increased as BAC increased further. Burghart et al.
(2013) report that BAC level has no effect on the risk preferences of men. Proestakis et al. (2013)
find that both measured and perceived BAC increase risk aversion for women while for men only
Rehm, 2013; Rehm et al., 2013).
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underestimation of one’s BAC has a positive effect on risk taking. The laboratory does not
provide consistent evidence either. Breslin et al., (1999), Cutter et al., (1973), Meier et al., (1996),
Sjöberg,, (1969), report no effects or mixed effects of alcohol on risk taking behavior. Lane et al.,
(2004) find alcohol consumption leads to more risk taking, but Corazzini et al. (2015) find that
alcohol consumption increases risk aversion for women while having no effect on men. With
respect to food choices, studies have found that alcohol consumption is correlated with high
energy intake (Caton et al., 2007; Yeomans, 2010; and Schrieks et al., 2015).2
There are at least a few studies that examine behavior in interactive settings. Haucap and Herr
(2014) develop a theoretical model to show how social drinking can facilitate trust by serving as a
signaling device assuming the old adage that in vino veritas.3 Corazzini et al. (2015) endow
participants with 20 euro and have them participate in a dictator game to study altruism. The
participants knew the money would go to either the humanitarian aid agency Medecins Sans
Frontieres or to the Italian website on economic information LaVoce.info. The authors report that
alcohol consumption had a negative and significant relationship on the amount of money donated.
Hopthrow et al. (2007) look at how alcohol influences cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
The authors find no difference in the level of cooperation for individuals in alcohol and placebo
treatments. Interestingly, the study also compares behavior by groups of people and finds that
groups are less cooperative when the group members had been drinking.
Our study looks at the causal impact alcohol has on multiple decision making tasks
simultaneously. The tasks used in our study are chosen to resemble tasks used in other cognitive
2

There is also some evidence that people who consume more alcohol tend to have lower quality
diets (van Kooten et al., 2007; Breslow et al., 2010 and 2013).
3
Frank et al. (2014) find support for this result in a cross-country analysis of trust levels and
liver cirrhosis.
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impairment studies; insofar as alcohol impairs mental resources, we can identify how this
translates to decision making. To create exogenous variation in alcohol consumption, a randomly
selected group of participants were given enough alcohol so to get to an expected 0.08 BAC level.
Our results indicate that at these levels of alcohol consumption, decision making is not impacted
very much; though it does appear that people cooperate more and are more altruistic in interactive
settings.
The design of this paper also offers an opportunity to explore any relationships that may exist
between overconfidence and the other tasks employed here. Research to date associates
overconfidence with lower perceptions of risk (Busenitz and Barney 1997; Palich and Badgy
1995; and Russo and Schoemaker 1992). Yet, more recent research has found no effect of
overconfidence on risk taking (Hardies et al., 2013). In the current study we elicit both
overconfidence and risk which allows us to explore for any possible correlations. This is
particularly important since if overconfidence is correlated with risk preferences it may lead to
people making sub-optimal decisions. For instance, Sandroni and Squintani (2007) in a model
similar to that with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) argue that if some agents are overconfident and
underestimate their risk and they may underinsure. Hence, if an agent who is overconfident is also
risk loving she may underinsure more than if the same subject is risk averse. The relationship
between anchoring and overconfidence is also explored using the data in this experiment.
Previous literature finds that while answers are correlated with anchors people do not provide
narrower interval answers (Block and Harper, 1991). The current experiment uses two counting
tasks to elicit anchoring and overconfidence and shows that while people are affected by the
anchor and are also overconfident the two measures are not significantly correlated with each

10

other. Overconfidence may also play a role in strategic situations. There is some indirect evidence
that overconfidence plays an important role in strategic situations. Camerer and Lovallo (1999)
show that more people enter the market when the success depends on one’s own abilities, which
they argue is because people are overconfident. Mertins and Hoffeld (2015) study cooperation in
a public goods game and find some indirect evidence that men hold more optimistic beliefs about
coworkers’ cooperativeness and cooperate more than those who are not overconfident. The
current study employs six different strategic situations which allow one to explore how
overconfident people behave in strategic situations.

2.3

Experimental Design

A between subjects design was implemented to examine the effect of alcohol consumption on
basic economic decision making. Participants were randomly assigned to either the treatment
group or the control group. The treatment group consumed an amount of alcohol expected to
generate a BAC of 0.08 (measured in grams of alcohol per deciliter of blood). The control group
did not consume a measurable amount of alcohol and thus maintained a BAC of 0.00 throughout
the study.
A total of 82 participants completed the study; half in each condition. Ten subjects who registered
for the study were not allowed to participate due to usage of prescription or over-the-counter
drugs in the 24 hour period prior to the start of the study. One treated subject became sick and
was not able to continue the study. The data from this subject and the matched control subject, as
explained below, are not included in the analysis. The experiments were conducted at the
Behavioral Business Research Lab (BBRL) at the University of Arkansas. Participants were
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drawn from the BBRLs standing subject pool. Of the participants, 54 were male and 28 were
female. All were at least 21 years of age.
All participants received a fixed payment of $10 for the 90 minute experiment. On average,
participants also earned $12.76 based upon their choices (described below). Because subjects in
the treatment group were required to remain in the lab until their BAC fell below 0.04, a process
that was expected to take an additional 3 hours, these subjects were paid an extra $15.00 to reflect
the opportunity cost of their time.4

2.3.1

Procedures

Potential subjects were contacted via email and invited to register online for a session. This initial
contact revealed that study participants might consume alcohol and therefore had to meet all of
the following criteria: 1) be 21 years of age with a valid ID, 2) not be pregnant, nursing, or trying
to become pregnant, 3) not taking prescription or over-the-counter drugs (other than birth control),
4) not taking illegal drugs, 5) not be under the care of a doctor or therapist for a condition that
precluded the use of alcohol, and 6) have consumed alcohol in the last 3 months without a
negative reaction. Potential subjects were also told that the actual experiment was expected to last
90 minutes, but that they needed to be able to remain in the lab for 4.5 hours as they would not be
allowed to leave until their BAC was below 0.04. Because of the large time commitment, sessions
were conducted in the evenings to minimize the disruption participation would have on a subject’s
4

All subjects were aware in advance that those who would be required to stay in the lab would
receive the additional money, but subjects were not informed which group they were in until after
the experiment. Had the two groups received the same compensation then the expected economic
profit would have differed between them. Payment for extra hours spent participating in the study
were commensurate with typical rates paid in the lab.
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daily routine. Finally, the subjects were told that they needed to abstain from eating or smoking
for three hours prior to arriving at the lab. Those interested in participating could log into their lab
accounts and register for a session. Registered subjects were given a notice the day before the
experiment reminding them of the conditions required for participation.
Upon arrival at the lab, subjects read an explanation of the study and gave informed consent. At
this point, females were given a BFP Midstream Pregnancy Test and directions. After completing
the pregnancy test in private, females initialed a statement indicating they were not pregnant.
Next, each person completed a medical screening questionnaire. After completing the
questionnaire, the respondents entered a second room where their responses were privately
reviewed by a researcher. Those who failed the screening were dismissed from the study. Those
who passed the screening signed a behavioral contract where they agreed to remain in the lab
until their BAC was below 0.04 and gave the researcher their car keys. These subjects were given
a numbered sticker to wear and sent to another room. This number was used as the subjects ID
number throughout the session. In the next room, a subject was weighed, given a breathalyzer
tube and a small plastic bag. The subject then had their BAC measured using a Alco-Sensor FST
(Intoximeter) breathalyzer, in part to familiarize the subject with the procedure. Any subject who
had a BAC above 0.00 would have been dismissed from the study, but this never occurred. This
initial BAC measure is referred to as BAC1. BACs were measured at several other points in the
experiment, as described below, and the plastic bag was used to store the tube between
measurements. At this point, the subject was taken to the computer lab.
In the computer lab, the subject was given a set of paper instructions describing the computerized
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tasks that would be encountered once the experiment began.5 Thus, the subjects all had a BAC of
0.00 when reading the directions. The directions are available in the Appendix and each of the
experimental tasks is described in the next subsection.
While subjects were reading the directions, researchers prepared a beverage for each subject in
the session. A session involved 10-20 subjects. Half of the subjects in a session were randomly
assigned to the treatment group. The beverage for a male in the treatment group consisted of 2.37
ml of 40% Vodka per kg the subject weighed. The beverage also included 3 ∗ 2.37 ml of tonic
water per kg the subject weighed. So for example, a 180 lb male received approximately 6.5 oz of
vodka and 19.5 oz of tonic water. For females in the treatment group the serving of vodka was
2.18 ml/kg and for tonic it was 3 ∗ 2.18 ml/kg.6 Males in the control group received 4 ∗ 2.37 ml
of tonic water per kg while females received 4 ∗ 2.18 ml of tonic water per kg. For all subjects,
the beverage was placed in a small pitcher and stirred. Some of the beverage was then poured into
a plastic cup. To mask the treatment to the subject, a trace amount of vodka was splashed over
both the pitcher and the cup and the cup rim was wiped with a vodka soaked sponge.
Once all of the drinks were ready, the drinks were served to the subjects at their computer
stations. The stations were separated by privacy dividers so that subjects could not see each other.
Subjects were given 20 minutes to consume their beverage. During this time a researcher read the
task directions aloud and answered any questions. Any beverage not consumed within the time
limit was collected and measured. Beginning 10 minutes after the subject finished drinking and
repeated every 5 minutes thereafter until the computerized experiment began, BAC was
5

The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
This dose is based on the recommendations from Friel et al. (1999) and has been used in many
studies to achieve this target BAC (e.g., Davis, et al. 2009).
6

14

measured. Because there is heterogeneity in the rate of absorption of alcohol into the blood, the
following procedures were used. First, unknown to the subjects, a subject pair always included
one person in the treatment condition and one person in the control group. This is because the
person in the control group could start the computer program at any point after having been
breathalyzed at this stage. Second, once a person in the treatment group registered a BAC above
0.06 the computer program was started. If a subject in the treatment group had not registered a
BAC above 0.06 with 25 minutes of finishing her drink, the computerized experiment was started.
Some treated subjects did not reach a BAC of 0.08 because they did not finish their drink whereas
others most likely had not complied with the fasting rule.7 The last BAC measurement recorded
before the computerized experiment began is denoted BAC2, even if the subject’s BAC was
measured several times at this stage.
Subjects faced 59 choices in the experiment. At the half way point, the program paused so that a
BAC reading could be obtained. This measure is denoted BAC3. The breathalyzer is always
administered in a standing position. Because the study included strategic games as described
below, subjects were in matched pairs. To hide the identity of the matched partner, who would
necessarily reach the halfway point at the same time, the two subjects were seated on opposite
sides of the computer lab. The computer lab is a large room with a moveable wall running down
the center aisle so that people on one side cannot see people on the other side. There were people
in both the treatment and control groups on both sides of the lab. All BAC measurements taken in
the computer lab were done in such a way that no participant could observe theirs or anyone’s
BAC.
7

It is possible that some of these subjects reached the 0.08 BAC in between measurements.
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After the last computerized choice, the breathalyzer was administered again. This measure is
denoted BAC4. Subjects then completed a brief survey, which asked them to guess the highest
BAC they reached, which is denoted Belief BAC. At this point, a subject was taken to a private
room and debriefed. Those subjects in the control group received their payment as well as a snack
(based on their choices in the experiment as described below), had their keys returned and were
dismissed from the experiment. Those subjects in the treatment group were also debriefed, but
were not paid at this point. They received a snack (based on their choices in the experiment), were
told their BAC4 measure and were taken to another room in the BBRL where they could work or
socialize. A breathalyzer was conducted every 30 minutes after a participant in the treatment
group completed the study until the participants BAC was below 0.04 at which point the
breathalyzer was administered more frequently. During this time, subject could have more of the
chosen snack as well as beverages (water, coke, energy drinks, etc.) provided by the researchers.
Once a subject had a measured BAC below 0.04 on two consecutive readings, the subject was
re-debriefed, paid, given their keys and dismissed. The final BAC reading was recorded as BAC5.
Most subjects in the treatment group had left the lab with 5 hours of start of the experiment,
although one subject was in the lab until 2:00 am for a session that began at 6:00 pm.
Figure 1 reports the four actual BAC measures and the Belief BAC reported by participants in post
experiment survey. There are several important observations based on the summary statistics
shown in Figure 1. First, BAC levels remain relatively steady for treated subjects while they are
making choices. Second, of the treated subjects, 17 were observed to have a BAC above 0.08 at
some point during the decision making portion of the experiment. It is important to keep in mind
that this is a lower limit on the number of subjects who actually had a BAC above 0.08 at some
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point in the study because BAC is only measured at discrete points in time. The average maximum
observed BAC was 0.078 (σ= 0.020), which is not statistically different from 0.08 (p-value =
0.876). However, there was considerable variation across treated individuals in terms of the
maximum observed BAC, which ranged from 0.036 to 0.128.8 Finally, many participants in the
control group perceive that their BAC is higher than 0 suggesting that the condition was masked.

2.3.2

The Tasks

Participants were presented with a series of 59 tasks. Each task was of one of the following types:
1) math tasks, 2) uncertainty tasks, 3) overconfidence tasks, 4) strategic games, 5) food choices,
6) anchoring tasks, and 7) altruism tasks. The number of each type of task a subject faced was the
same for all subjects, but the order was randomized for each subject.
The experiment also included three control tasks to verify that subjects were making deliberate
choices: one for overconfidence, one for strategic games, and one for risk. There were different
sub-tasks for some of these tasks. Below we describe each of these main tasks and discuss the
sub-tasks and methods that were used to create specific realizations. Examples of all tasks can be
found in the Appendix.
8

This heterogeneity was likely impacted by how much fasting the subjects had done before
arriving at the lab.
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Figure 1: Measured BAC for Treatment Group and Perceived BAC by Condition

Math
There were three types of math problems: addition, multiplication, and word problems. The
addition problems were of the form add a1 + a2 where a1 ∼ [11,99] and a2 ∼ [1,20]. The
multiplication problems were of the form multiply m1 ∗ m2 where m1 ∼ [13,19] and m2 ∼ [5,9].
The word problems are from the Cognitive Reflection Task (CRT) of Frederick (2005).9 For each
question subjects had a ten second time limit for the addition and multiplication problems and 20
second limit for the CRT problems and if they answered the question correctly they earned $20
for that period. Otherwise, the subject earned $0 for this type of task (and thus an incorrect
response and a failure to respond are treated identically). Over the course of the experiment a
subject faced five addition, five multiplication, and three word (CRT) problems.
Uncertainty Tasks
9

While the CRT questions are used to measure the impulsiveness of subjects, the questions
themselves are basic math problems.
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Over the course of the experiment, a subject faced 18 decisions under uncertainty. For each
question the subject had ten seconds to make a decision. If a subject failed to respond within the
time limit then she earned $0. For the uncertainty tasks, lotteries always had two equally likely
outcomes and were presented as a circle with a line through the middle.
For four of the risky decisions a subject was given an endowment of $2 and faced a choice of the
form pick between $g with certainty or $2g+2 with a 50% chance and $0 with a 50% chance. For
these tasks, framed as financial gains, taking on a risk is beneficial in expected value. Subjects
also faced four risk decisions framed as losses. For these tasks, the subject was given an
endowment from which losses could be reduced.10 The lotteries were constructed in such a way
that the possible outcomes (endowment minus loss) were the same as those described above for
the gain domain. Hence, for these tasks taking a risk increases one’s expected payoff.
The third type of risky choice presented two options with the same expected value, but where the
variance differed between the two choices. Such task allow for the classification of a subject as
risk loving or risk averse. Subjects faced three of these types of risks. Subjects also completed
three tasks to measure the higher order risk property of prudence and three tasks to measure the
higher order risk properties of temperance. These higher order risk properties can be identified
through binary choices over compound lotteries (see Deck and Schlesinger 2014 for a discussion).
Finally, subjects faced one risky choice in which the risky option first order stochastically
dominated the certain payment option. This choice serves as check that participants are making
deliberate choices.
10

Due to institutional restrictions participants cannot lose money they had before entering the
laboratory.
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Overconfidence Task
Subjects faced nine overconfidence tasks, which closely follow Bregu and Forbes (2015). In these
tasks, subjects were shown a grid of 100 colored rectangles and were instructed to count the
number of red rectangles. The rectangles were only shown to participants for six seconds before
they were required to report the number of red rectangles. Then the subject was asked to identify
how accurate her guess had been. A subject who stated her response was within 1 of the correct
answer would earn $25 if her guess was in fact within 1 of the correct answer. If she correctly
reported being with 3 of the true number she would earn $20, within 6 would earn $14, and within
12 would earn $6. If the number of red rectangles reported by the subject was not within the
claimed bounds, then the subject was overconfident and earned $0. No time limit was imposed on
reporting the number of red rectangles or in providing ones confidence. Participants were not
provided with any feedback at the end of the overconfidence task so they could not learn how
effective they were at guessing the number of red rectangles. In general the time limit was too
short to count the number of red rectangles; however, subjects did experience one overconfidence
task with no red rectangles to serve as a check on responses.
Strategic Games
Subjects played seven strategic games. Two of the games were prisoner’s dilemmas in which
subjects chose to either cooperate or defect. If both players cooperated, then both earned $20. If
both defected then both earned $10. In the low gain version, if one player defected while the other
cooperated then the defector earned $25 and the cooperator earned $5. In the high gain version,
the defector earned $30 while the cooperator earned $0.
Subjects also played two games of chicken. If both players were tough (non-cooperative), then
20

both of the players earned $0. In the high reward game, playing tough while the counterpart plays
chicken (cooperative) earns $35 for one’s self and $5 for the counterpart while if both play
chicken then both earn $10. In the low reward game, playing tough when one’s counterpart plays
chicken results in a payoff of $30 for ones self and $5 for the counterpart while both earn $20 if
both play chicken.
Additionally, subjects played two stag-hunt games. In these games, the non-cooperative action
results in a guaranteed payment of $10. In the high reward game, if both players are cooperative
they both earn $22. In the low reward game, mutual cooperation only results in a payoff of $18 to
each player. In either game, being cooperative when the other player is not results in a payoff of
$0. Finally, subjects faced one strategic game that was designed as a check. In this game, the
subjects own choice did not impact the counterpart, but the subject did have a dominant strategy.
In all of the strategic games, the actions were unlabeled. That is, no action was identified to the
subjects as being cooperative. The row and column associated with the cooperative action was
reverse the second time a subject saw a particular type of strategic game.
Snack Choice
In four tasks, participants were presented with two snack options, one healthy and one unhealthy
based upon the calorie content. Subjects had ten seconds to respond to each question.
Anchoring
The anchoring task had two stages. In the first stage participants were shown a ten by ten matrix
of letter “S” and number “5” characters for two seconds. The participants were then asked to state
if there were more “S” characters or fewer “S” characters than a randomly generated number that
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flashed below the matrix. The randomly generated number was equally likely to be any integer
from one to 100 and was drawn independently of the number of “S” characters in the matrix. In
the second stage subjects saw the matrix again while the random number, which serves as the
anchor, was shown below the matrix. Subjects had ten seconds to count and enter the number of
“S” characters in the matrix. This time is not enough for the typical participant to count all the
characters. Subjects were paid based on their accuracy in reporting the number of “S” characters
in the matrix. If they were within five of the correct number they earned $15. If participants were
further away than five or failed to enter an answer in the allotted time they earned $0. Each
subject faced five anchoring tasks.
Altruism
Three dictator decision were used to measure altruism. One decision was a standard dictator
game in which the subject was endowed with 30 tokens to allocate between herself a randomly
assigned counterpart. Each token was valued at $1 in this case. In the high cost of giving dictator
game, the subject was endowed with 20 tokens to allocate and each token the subject kept was
valued at $2 while each token given to the counterpart was valued at $1. In the low cost of giving
game, the dictator again had 20 tokens, but the value of any token that was kept was $1 and the
value of any token allocated to the counterpart was $2.
Payment
At the conclusion of the experiment, a participant received two forms of compensation. First, she
received the selected option from one of her four snack choice tasks. Second, she received a
payment based upon her earnings in one non-snack choice task. If a participant was paid based on
a choice in a strategic game, then the counterpart was also paid based upon this same strategic
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game. If a dictator decision was selected for payment, then this held for the counterpart as well
and further one person in the pair was randomly selected to be the recipient.

2.4

Results

The data consist of the choices of 82 participants on 59 choice tasks. However, three of the tasks
were designed to verify that subjects were making deliberate rather than random choices. In each
case, subjects were more likely to select the dominant option. More importantly, the answers for
these questions do not differ by treatment or BAC level.11 These three questions are dropped from
the analysis leaving 4592 choices.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics by treatment for each decision task. The outcome variable
differs across the task types. For the Math tasks including the CRT word problems, we report the
fraction of individuals who responded with a correct answer. For these tasks, non-responses
(blanks) are coded as incorrect. The remaining tasks did not have correct answers and thus
omitted responses were left unassigned. For the Uncertainty tasks, we report the fraction that
selected to take more risk, more variance, more prudence, or more temperance. For the
overconfidence task, we report the fraction of overconfident responses. For the Strategic Games,
we report the fraction that play the cooperative action. For the Snack Choice task, we report the
fraction that choose the healthy (lower calorie) snack. For the anchoring task, we report the
fraction of biased answers that are on the same side of the true answer as the anchor.12 For the
Altruism task, we report the amount of money that the dictator allotted to the receiver. It should
11

For example, one such check involved the overconfidence task with no red rectangles. 97.6%
of the control group and 100% of the treatment group answered this task correctly.
12
Statistical results are unchanged if the fraction of responses lying between the anchor and the
correct answer are used instead.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for each subtask.
C ONTROL

T REATMENT

Percent

Obs

Blank

Percent

Obs

Blank

Wald Test

Correct Addition

88.8%

205

9

87.3%

205

11

p = 0.696

Correct Multiplication

48.8%

205

48

49.8%

205

41

p = 0.887

Correct CRT

15.5%

123

16

13.0%

123

15

p = 0.669

All Math

56.5%

533

73

55.9%

533

67

p = 0.882

Beneficial Risk Taking (gains)

61.6%

164

0

62.0%

163

1

p = 0.960

Beneficial Risk Taking (losses)

52.8%

161

3

59.2%

164

0

p = 0.333

Variance Increasing Risk Taking

39.2%

120

3

40.3%

119

4

p = 0.879

Prudence

54.1%

122

1

57.4%

122

1

p = 0.651

Temperance

52.3%

109

14

52.2%

113

10

p = 0.989

41.9%

327a

0

49.4%

328

0

p = 0.132

Prisoner’s Dil. (Large Gain)

48.3%

29a

0

44.8%

29a

0

p = 0.797

Prisoner’s Dil. (Small Gain)

69.0%

29a

0

75.9%

29a

0

p = 0.565

Chicken Game (Large Gain)

56.1%

41

0

65.9%

41

0

p = 0.371

Chicken Game (Small Gain)

31.7%

41

0

31.7%

41

0

p = 1.000

Stag Hunt (Large Gain)

75.6%

41

0

85.4%

41

0

p = 0.271

Stag Hunt (Small Gain)

34.2%

41

0

43.9%

41

0

p = 0.371

Strategic Games (All 6)

51.8%

222

0

57.7%

222

0

p = 0.157

40.2%

164

0

31.1%

164

0

p = 0.135

62.8%

164

41

59.6%

151

54

p = 0.533

Standard Dictator’s Game

$6.29

41

0

$8.34

41

0

p = 0.240

Low Cost of Giving

$8.78

41

0

$10.34

41

0

p = 0.482

High Cost of Giving

$4.02

41

0

$5.61

41

0

p = 0.191

Dictator’s Game All 3

$6.37

123

0

$8.10

123

0

p = 0.223

Math

Uncertainty Tasks

Overconfidence
Overconfident
Cooperation Rate in Games

Snack Choice
Healthy Choice
Anchoring
Anchoring Bias
Altruism

a. The missing observations for both prisoner’s dilemma tasks (12 observations for each task) and the
overconfidence task (1 observation) are due to a coding error.
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be noted that for the overconfidence, altruism, and strategic games, subjects had to give an answer
to continue with the experiment, so there are no blanks for those answers. There are no blanks in
the food choice task because subjects always selected one of the two items despite these tasks
being timed.13 The last column of Table 1 reports the p-value from a Wald Test on the treatment
coefficient when the performance in each task is regressed on treatment, with no additional
controls. In all regressions, the standard errors were clustered by participant.14 As is apparent
from the Table 1, we do not find any treatment effects for the main tasks. There is however a
significant difference in the distribution of self-reported accuracy on the Overconfidence task
between the treatment and control groups (p-value = 0.027 for chi-squared test) as treated subjects
tend to self-report lower accuracy levels.15
In what follows, we estimate OLS regressions that relate performance in each task to the
treatment and BAC level.16 The dependent variables are the same as the variables listed in Table
1, and all regressions include clustered standard errors at the participant level. Table 2 presents
the p-values for β1 in equations (1) and (2). In equation (1) the dependent variable is regressed on
an indicator designating assignment into the alcohol treatment, and in equation (2) the actual
blood alcohol level at the midway point of the experiment, BAC3, is used. To explore any gender
effects both a dummy for gender (Male = 1) is used and an interaction term with treatment and
13

This provides further evidence that subjects were paying attention throughout the study.
Subjects did not receive any feedback about their matched partner’s action in the strategic
games until the study was over and all other tasks are individual choices. Therefore, clustering is
performed at the subject level rather than the matched pair level.
15
For subjects in the control group, the percentage of self-reported accuracies within 1, within
3, within 6, and within 12 are 8%, 28%, 41%, and 23% respectively. For the treatment group the
respective percentages are 5%, 20%, 51%, and 24%.
16
The qualitative results remain unchanged if probit regressions are used for binary limited
dependent variables.
14
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BAC3 is included.17 The variable Period, which takes values one through 59, is used to control
for any time trends in the data. For the overconfidence estimation, we also control for
self-reported accuracy since its distribution varies by treatment.

Dep. Variable = β0 + β1 Treatment + β2 Gender + β3 Gender×Treatment + β4 Period

(1)

Dep. Variable = β0 + β1 BAC3 + β2 Gender + β3 Gender×BAC3 + β4 Period

(2)

Table 2 reports the p-value of β1 and suppresses information on other coefficients in equations (1)
and (2). The results from Table 2 indicate that there is generally very little treatment effect for any
of the tasks in this experiment. The one exception is in the (large gain) Stag Hunt game where
treated subjects are more cooperative. This result also holds when controlling for actual BAC
level.18 All regression results are robust to using the starting BAC level (BAC2), the ending BAC
level (BAC4) as well as the maximum or average BAC level (of BAC2, BAC3, and BAC4).19
We find no strong evidence of a time trend (p-value > 0.05 for both specifications for all tasks).
We also find very little evidence of any gender differences on the effects of alcohol on decision
making. While we find that men correctly answer a significantly greater number of CRT
questions (p-value < 0.05 for both equations), this does not vary with treatment.20 The positive
effect of gender on CRT questions answered correctly confirms previous findings that men
17

Burghart et al., 2013, Corazzini et al., 2015, and Proestakis et al., 2013 suggest that alcohol
may have differential effects for men and women.
18
If a Bonferroni correction is used, this result would not be statistically significant.
19
Some participants were allowed to begin the experiment with blood alcohol levels below 0.06.
If we exclude these individuals from the analysis, the results are substantively unchanged.
20
The CRT questions are designed to have intuitive, but incorrect answers. The number of
intuitive answers does not differ between the treatment and control groups nor does it depend on
BAC. Also, we find no gender difference in the number of intuitive answers given.
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perform better than women on these type of questions (e.g. Bosch-Domch et al., 2014). For the
(large gain) Stag Hunt game we find that men are more cooperative in the control group (p-value
< 0.01 for both equations), but we find no gender difference for treated subjects.
In addition to BAC, we also analyze subjects’ self-reported Belief BAC. Thus we can also
examine how the subjects’ perceived level of intoxication impacts their behavior. However, one
should be cautious in inferring causality from these results as the belief is endogenous. For
example, it could be that believing you are drunk leads you to behave a certain way, but it could
also be that you report being drunk to justify your action. To explore the relationship between
perceived BAC and actual BAC we reconduct the analysis in Column 2 of Table 2, but we include
the following variable “Belief BAC-BAC3,” which controls for the error in belief of blood alcohol
content. Previous work has found that the effects of overestimating and underestimating one’s
level of intoxication to be different (e.g. Proestakis et al., 2013 and Laude and Fillmore, 2016).
Therefore, for the treatment group we add two variables to the specification in equation (2). The
first, Overestimation, takes the value Belief BAC-BAC3 when this difference is positive and is
zero otherwise. The second, Underestimation, takes the value Belief BAC-BAC3 when this
difference is negative and is zero otherwise.
Because the control group can only overestimate their level of intoxication, separate analysis is
conducted for each group. As BAC3 is zero for the control group, that term is dropped from the
estimating equation. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 3.
The results in Table 3 reveal some interesting relationships. Subjects in the control were more
likely to select unhealthy snack choices the more they overestimated their BAC (p-value = 0.038).
Of course, it could be that they reported a higher BAC to justify their snack choice. These subjects

27

Table 2: Regression results for each subtask.
P-values are reported for the treatment or BAC3 variable.
OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.
Treatment

BAC3

Correct Addition

0.848

0.861

Correct Multiplication

0.676

0.411

Correct CRT

0.587

0.410

All Math

0.959

0.812

Beneficial Risk Taking (gains)

0.421

0.671

Beneficial Risk Taking (losses)

0.503

0.391

Variance Increasing Risk Taking

0.569

0.642

Prudence

0.702

0.968

Temperance

0.498

0.446

0.405

0.183

Prisoner’s Dil. (Large Gain)

0.587

0.870

Prisoner’s Dil. (Small Gain)

0.451

0.398

Chicken Game (Large Gain)

0.795

0.874

Chicken Game (Small Gain)

0.848

0.718

Stag Hunt (Large Gain)

0.024

0.009

Stag Hunt (Small Gain)

0.825

0.886

Strategic Games (All 6)

0.533

0.201

0.966

0.947

0.935

0.405

Standard Dictator’s Game

0.998

0.656

Low Cost of Giving

0.577

0.833

High Cost of Giving

0.951

0.715

Dictator’s Game All 3

0.735

0.878

Math

Uncertainty Tasks

Overconfidence
Overconfident
Cooperation Rate in Games

Snack Choice
Healthy Choice
Anchoring
Anchoring Bias
Altruism
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Table 3: Regression results for each subtask.
P-values are reported from OLS regressions
with standard errors clustered by participant.
C ONTROL

T REATMENT

Overestimation

BAC3

Overestimation

Underestimation

Correct Addition

0.797

0.857

0.111

0.278

Correct Multiplication

0.290

0.445

0.258

0.134

Correct CRT

0.230

0.153

0.382

0.192

All Math

0.682

0.700

0.893

0.359

Beneficial Risk Taking (gains)

0.252

0.224

0.855

0.544

Beneficial Risk Taking (losses)

0.551

0.687

0.146

0.447

Variance Increasing Risk Taking

0.173

0.732

0.859

0.614

Prudence

0.961

0.166

0.842

0.359

Temperance

0.152

0.255

0.056

0.197

0.012

0.150

0.110

0.383

Prisoner’s Dil. (Large Gain)

0.197

0.000

0.001

0.079

Prisoner’s Dil. (Small Gain)

0.295

0.643

0.480

0.248

Chicken Game (Large Gain)

0.862

0.956

0.142

0.847

Chicken Game (Small Gain)

0.548

0.618

0.822

0.870

Stag Hunt (Large Gain)

0.982

0.127

0.578

0.838

Stag Hunt (Small Gain)

0.234

0.190

0.362

0.259

Strategic Games (All 6)

0.363

0.003

0.034

0.378

0.038

0.772

0.318

0.528

0.369

0.004

0.945

0.837

Standard Dictator’s Game

0.114

0.019

0.652

0.725

Low Cost of Giving

0.872

0.360

0.354

0.331

High Cost of Giving

0.112

0.401

0.169

0.192

Dictator’s Game All 3

0.312

0.023

0.400

0.223

Math

Uncertainty Tasks

Overconfidence
Overconfident
Cooperation Rate in Games

Snack Choice
Healthy Choice
Anchoring
Anchoring Bias
Altruism
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also became more overconfident the more they overestimated their BAC (p-value = 0.012). For
subjects in the treatment group, the only case where over- or underestimation has a significant
relationship with behavior at the 95% confidence level is for the (Large Gain) Prisoner’s Dilemma
game where subjects who overestimate their BAC are more cooperative. The behavior in this
game is sufficient to yield a similar conclusion when looking at the strategic games combined. We
also note that once we control for over- and underestimation higher BAC levels are associated
with less anchoring bias and more cooperation in the (Large Gain) Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the
combined game data, the standard dictator game, and the combined dictator data.
The data gathered from this experiment offer a good opportunity for one to explore any
relationship that may exist between overconfidence and the tasks employed here. Model (3) and
(4) are used to estimate regression results for the control group and for all the data together. These
results are presented in Table 4. As is apparent there are no systemic relationships between
overconfidence and any of the tasks we employ here. Overconfidence is significantly correlated
only for Model (4) using all the data from the math tasks and Chicken Game (Large Gain). In the
case of the math tasks overconfidence is only marginally correlated while in the Chicken Game it
is significant at the five percent level. As we have pointed out above given the high number of
tests we have these results would not be significant if any correction was done to account for this.
These results add to the existing literature in two important ways. First, the results of this paper
on the relationship of overconfidence and risk preferences are in line with Hardies et al. (2013)
who also find no statistically significant relationship. Second, our results on the relationship of
overconfidence and anchoring are similar to the findings in Block and Harper (1991). In addition
to this, we provide some evidence of the relationship between overconfidence and one’s math
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ability, behavior in strategic situations, altruism and food choices.
Dep. Variable = β0 + β1 Overconfidence +β2 BAC

(3)

Dep. Variable = β0 + β1 Overconfidence +β2 BAC + β3 Gender + β4 Period

(4)

Table 4: The correlation of overconfidence with each subtask.
P-values are reported from OLS regressions.
Standard errors clustered by participant.
C ONTROL

A LL DATA

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Correct Addition

0.320

0.344

0.338

0.344

Correct Multiplication

0.946

1.000

0.156

0.149

Correct CRT

0.548

0.469

0.965

0.992

All Math

0.608

0.629

0.218

0.209

Beneficial Risk Taking (gains)

0.641

0.629

0.075

0.077

Beneficial Risk Taking (losses)

0.588

0.659

0.395

0.418

Variance Increasing Risk Taking

0.791

0.830

0.988

0.949

Prudence

0.757

0.685

0.852

0.866

Temperance

0.250

0.222

0.520

0.556

Prisoner’s Dil. (Large Gain)

0.479

0.548

0.598

0.614

Prisoner’s Dil. (Small Gain)

0.905

0.755

0.663

0.407

Chicken Game (Large Gain)

0.285

0.401

0.012

0.022

Chicken Game (Small Gain)

0.411

0.366

0.597

0.549

Stag Hunt (Large Gain)

0.969

0.934

0.285

0.283

Stag Hunt (Small Gain)

0.987

0.790

0.892

0.749

Strategic Games (All 6)

0.580

0.683

0.069

0.090

0.620

0.733

0.671

0.698

0.593

0.603

0.759

0.812

Standard Dictator’s Game

0.719

0.649

0.483

0.448

Low Cost of Giving

0.779

0.943

0.593

0.490

High Cost of Giving

0.542

0.496

0.643

0.640

Dictator’s Game All 3

0.859

0.970

0.691

0.662

Math

Uncertainty Tasks

Cooperation Rate in Games

Snack Choice
Healthy Choice
Anchoring
Anchoring Bias
Altruism
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2.5

Discussion

In this study, we use a lab experiment to exogenously vary the blood alcohol concentration of
participants to examine how decision making is impacted in a variety of economic tasks. We
successfully manipulate the blood alcohol concentration for 41 individuals, as measured by a
breathalyzer. Over the course of an hour, participants completed a series of 59 individual and
social tasks, including math tasks, uncertainty tasks, overconfidence tasks, strategic games, food
choice tasks, anchoring tasks, and altruism tasks. A control group completed the same set of
tasks, but was not treated with alcohol. Overall, we find no systemic differences in behavior
between the control and treatment groups and for the vast majority of tasks we find no statistical
difference at all. We also note that we compared the salient payoffs of the two groups and we find
that people in the control and alcohol treatments did not earn statistically different amounts of
money over the course of the study. However, we do find that people’s perception of their BAC
matters. Specifically, those in the control group who report believing that they have a high BAC
are more overconfident and are more likely to select higher calorie snacks. It is tempting to
conclude that our findings of perceived BAC impacting overconfidence and food choice are
indications of a psychological effect of alcohol, but some other characteristic could be driving the
behavior and the willingness to self-report a high BAC belief.
That we did not find alcohol to have an impact on risk-taking is in line with Meier et al. (1996)
and Breslin et al. (1999), although Corazzini et al. (2015) and Proestakis et al. (2013) find that
alcohol impacts risk taking among women.21 However, whereas we find no effect of alcohol
consumption on altruistic behavior, Corazzini et al. (2015) find that subjects become less
21

Evidence that alcohol consumption is correlated with risk taking is found in survey based
studies by Barsky et al. (1995), Anderson and Mellor (2008) and Galizzi and Miraldo (2012).
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altruistic when they consume alcohol. While it is not clear why the findings differ, one possible
explanation is that the tasks we employ are different. Corazzini et al. (2015) ask participants to
donate money to two NGOs while we used standard dictator games where participants allocated
some money to another person in the experiment. One result that we find particularly puzzling is
that performance on math problems did not differ between the control and treatment groups. This
suggest that the impairment of cognitive ability from consuming an amount of alcohol designed
to target a BAC of 0.08 is smaller than that of memorizing an 8-digit number (see Deck and
Jahedi 2015). In fact, whereas Deck and Jahedi (2015) find that people make poorer decisions
under the cognitive load for a variety of tasks including some of the same ones we study here, for
alcohol we find no systematic decreases in decision making quality. Anecdotally, there was
considerable heterogeneity in how the alcohol affected participants. The two subjects who
became ill (one during and one after the study) never had a measured BAC above 0.07. The
person who had the highest measured BAC did not show any signs of impairment. This may
explain the general lack of significance in our findings, but it could also suggest that BAC is not a
good measure of intoxication despite the reliance placed on it by the legal system. It would be
interesting to know how larger dosages of alcohol impact behavior as there is a level at which
cognitive ability falters, but there are clear ethical and legal issues with doing so. There are also
several other interesting avenues for research looking at the impact of alcohol on economic
decision making, such as how alcohol impacts bargaining behavior to the degree that deals are
struck over drinks. Similarly, as more and more localities legalize the medical and recreational
use of marijuana, parallel research on its effect on economic decision making is warranted.
Lastly, the paper adds to the existing experimental evidence on the relationship between risk and
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overconfidence. Using different risk measures we find that there is no significant correlation
between the overconfidence and risk preferences. This finding is very important when one
considers markets in which both risk preferences and overconfidence can play a major role (i.e.
insurance markets). We also explore the relationship between overconfidence and the
performance on the other tasks and find no significant relationship for any of them.
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Appendix
Instructions
In todays study you will make a series of economic choices. At the end of the study you will be
paid based upon your choices, so it is important that you understand these instructions completely.
This payment is in addition to the fixed amount of money you are receiving for participating in the
study. The choices are timed, so it is not possible for you or the researcher to pause the study once
it begins. So please ask any questions you may while you are reading the directions.
You should not communicate with or distract others during the study including this time in
the directions. This means that you should not talk and that you should turn off and put away all
electronic devices.
There are six different types of tasks that you will encounter.
Math Tasks:
You will be given a problem and asked to solve it. If you are correct you will earn $15 for
that task. If you are wrong you will earn $0 for the task. Some math tasks are addition and
multiplication problems like 15+25=

or 34*15=

. Other math tasks are word problems.

Counting Tasks:
You will be asked to count items in a table. The more accurate you are the more you will be
paid.
There are two types of counting tasks.
One type of counting task will show you 100 colored rectangle and you will need to count
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how many are red. You will only have 6 seconds to count the rectangles. You will then be asked
to enter the number of rectangles. Finally, you will be asked to identify how accurate your answer
was.
If you state that your guess was within 1 of the true number of red rectangles and you are
right, you will get paid $25, but if you are wrong you will earn $0.
If you state that your guess was within 3 of the true number of red rectangles and you are
right, you will get paid $20, but if you are wrong you will earn $0.
If you state that your guess was within 6 of the true number of red rectangles and you are
right, you will get paid $14, but if you are wrong you will earn $0.
If you state that your guess was within 9 of the true number of red rectangles and you are
right, you will get paid $6, but if you are wrong you will earn $0.
The second type of counting task will show you a table with 100 characters. Each character
will be either a number “5” or a letter “S”. You will be shown the table for 10 seconds and then
asked to guess if the number of letter S characters is smaller or bigger than a randomly generated
number. You will then be given 10 seconds table to view the table again. After that you will be
asked to report the number of letter S characters. If your answer is with 5 of the correct number
you will earn $20.
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Uncertainty Tasks:
You will first be given an endowment of money (money that you will receive with certainty).
You will also be asked to select between two options to determine the additional payment (the
additional payment may be positive or negative). Some options are fixed amounts of money. These
are shown as circles with a dollar amount inside. Some options are lotteries. Lotteries are shown
as a circle with a line through the middle. For a lottery, there is a 50% chance you will receive what
is on the left side of the circle and a 50% chance that you will receive what is on the right side of
the circle. Sometimes what is on the left or right side is another lottery. Here are some examples.

If you select an option like the figure above you would receive an additional $10.

If you select an option like the figure above you would receive an additional $20 with a 50%
chance and lose $2 with a 50% chance.

If you select an option like the figure above you would receive an additional $10 with a 50%
chance and with a 50% chance would receive a second lottery. From this second lottery you would
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gain $20 with a 50% chance and lose $2 with a fifty percent chance. You will have 10 seconds to
answer each of these tasks, after that the experiment will continue and you will receive $0 if you
did not select one of the options.
Table Tasks:
You will be randomly and anonymously matched with someone else in the study for this task.
You and the other person will be shown a table like the following.
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$W, $W

$X, $Y

You pick option B

$Y, $X

$Z, $Z

Each of you will pick either option A or option B. The combination of the two choices identifies a cell in the table. Each cell lists your earnings and the earnings of the other person.
If you both pick A you both earn $W. If you pick A and the other person picks B then you
earn $X and they earn $Y. If you pick B and the other person picks A then you earn $Y and they
earn $X. If you both pick B you both earn $Z.
Food and Beverage Tasks:
You will be shown two options, either two drinks or two snacks. Your earnings are the item
you selected.
Payment
You will not be paid for every task. Instead, one single task from among all of the Math Tasks,
Counting Tasks, Allocation Tasks, Uncertainty Tasks, and Table Tasks will be randomly selected
and you will be paid based on your earnings in that task. This does not mean that you are paid for
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one task of each type. For example, if you are paid for a Math Task you will not be paid for a Table
Task. If you are paid for a Table Task so is the person that you were randomly matched with. If
you are paid for the Allocation Task then so is the person that you were randomly matched with.
Further, only one of you will have your allocation choice implemented. That is, if your allocation
choice is implemented then this is all of the additional money that you and the other person will
receive in this study.
You will also receive the option you selected in one of the Food and Beverage Tasks.
Tasks
Math
Addition
1.

35 + 9 =

2.

46 + 17 =

3.

27 + 18 =

4.

37 + 17 =

5.

43 + 19 =

Multiplication
1.

16 ∗ 8 =

2.

13 ∗ 7 =

3.

18 ∗ 5 =

4.

14 ∗ 9 =
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5.

19 ∗ 6 =

CRT

1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost (in dollars)?
2. It takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets. How many minutes would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets (enter a numeric value)?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake? (enter a numeric value)

Uncertainty tasks
Beneficial Risk Taking (gains)

1. {sure gain $6} or {50% gain 0, 50% gain $14}
2. {sure gain $8} or {50% gain 0, 50% gain $18}
3. {sure gain $10} or {50% gain 0, 50% gain $22}
4. {sure gain $12} or {50% gain 0, 50% gain $26}
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Beneficial Risk Taking (losses)

1. {sure loss $8} or {50% lose 0, 50% lose $14}
2. {sure loss $10} or {50% lose 0, 50% lose $18}
3. {sure loss $12} or {50% lose 0, 50% lose $22}
4. {sure loss $15} or {50% lose 0, 50% lose $28}
Variance Increasing Risk Taking
1.

Pair 1

2.

Pair 2
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3.

Pair 3

Prudence
1.

Pair 1

2.

Pair 2

3.

Pair 3
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Temperance
1.

Pair 1

2.

Pair 2

3.

Pair 3
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Overconfidence Tasks
1.

2.

Task 1

Task 2
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3.

Task 3

4.

Task 4
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5.

Task 5

6.

Task 6
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7.

Task 7

8.

Task 8
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Strategic Games
1.

Prisoner’s Dilemma (Large Gain)
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$10,$10

$30,$0

You pick option B

$0,$30

$20,$20

2.

Prisoner’s Dilemma (Small Gain)
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$20,$20

$5,$25

You pick option B

$25,$5

$10,$10

3.

Chicken Game (Large Gain)
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$10,$10

$5,$30

You pick option B

$30,$5

$0,$0

4.

Chicken Game (Small Gain)
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$0,$0

$30,$5

You pick option B

$5,$30

$20,$20

5.

Stag Hunt Game (Large Gain)
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$10,$10

$10,$0

You pick option B

$0,$10

$18,$18
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6.

Stag Hunt Game (Small Gain)
Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$22,$22

$0,$10

You pick option B

$10,$0

$10,$10

Food Choice Pairs
Below we show the four pairs of snacks subjects saw in the experiment.
Healthy choice

Unhealthy choice

1.

Pair 1

2.

Pair 2

54

3.

Pair 3

4.

Pair 4
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Altruism
1. Participants had an endowment of 30 tokens. One token was worth $1 for the
dictator and $1 for the receiver.
2. Participants had an endowment of 20 tokens. One token was worth $2 for the
dictator and $1 for the receiver.
3. Participants had an endowment of 20 tokens. One token was worth $1 for the
dictator and $2 for the receiver.

Check Tasks
In addition to the tasks above we included three check tasks.
1.

Check “Uncertainty” Task

{sure gain $10} or {sure gain $20}
2.

Check Strategic Games

Opponent picks option A

Opponent picks option B

You pick option A

$10,$10

$10,$20

You pick option B

$20,$10

$20,$20
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3.

Check “Overconfidence” Task
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3

Chapter 2

Overconfidence and Trading Behavior: Does There Exist a Causal Link?

Abstract
The existing literature argues that people overestimate the accuracy of their information,
which then leads to higher trading volume and lower profits in financial markets. The literature to
date has shown that there exists a correlation, but the existing literature has not established a clean
causal relationship. This paper reports a laboratory experiment designed to establish this causal
relationship. Using design that is similar to Deaves et al. (2008), in that it is designed to study trading behavior when signals depend on the performance on an overconfidence task, I show that there
exists a causal link between overconfidence and trading behavior. Markets with heterogeneous accuracy of information, due to the performance on the overconfidence task, aggregate information
at similar levels to markets where the accuracy is homogenous and the distribution of information
is common knowledge. Lastly, no gender differences are found on the level of overconfidence, on
trading volume, and on profits.
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3.1

Introduction

Recently financial models have been modified to account for a variety of behavioral biases,
one of the most researched being overconfidence. Theoretical models conclude that overconfidence about one’s accuracy of information leads to higher trading volume and lower utility (Odean,
1998), and this finding is supported by empirical research (i.e., Biais et al., 2005; Glaser and Weber,
2007; Deaves et al., 2008). While there has been extensive research on the effects of overconfidence on trading behavior, researchers have not established a clean causal relationship to date.
This paper fills a void in the literature by offering experimental evidence of the effects of overconfidence on trading behavior. To achieve this goal, I use feedback that eliminates the possibility
for one to be overconfident to establish the causal link between overconfidence on trading behavior. Feedback is a natural tool to manipulate the trading environment to establish this causal link
because feedback has been shown to play a very important role in improving one’s calibration and
lowering overconfidence (Arkes et al., 1987; Hoch and Loewenstein, 1989; Remus et al., 1996;
Pulford and Colman, 1997; Eberlin et al., 2011). This suggests that feedback that eliminates one’s
overestimation of the accuracy of information may also mitigate the negative effects of overconfidence on trading. To examine this, a baseline experiment where traders can be overconfident about
the accuracy of their information is designed. Feedback is provided in two additional conditions to
establish the causal link between overconfidence and asset markets.
The experiment builds on the work of Deaves et al. (2008), who use the performance on
the task used to elicit overconfidence to determine the accuracy of the signals traders receive. In
Deaves et al. (2008) the accuracy of the signal is determined before trading starts, and it is the same
through all trading periods. In the current experiment, participants complete a task before each
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trading period, and the signal they receive depends on their performance on this task. This same
task is used in the first stage of the experiment to elicit two different measures of overconfidence:
overestimation and overplacement. Overestimation occurs when one overestimates her ability,
while overplacement occurs when one overplaces her relative ability (Moore and Healy, 2007).
Another difference between the current experiment and Deaves et al. (2008) is the market structure.
In Deaves et al. (2008) the dividends are chosen from a uniform distribution with values between
one and 99, in the current paper the asset value is either zero or 100. Hence, the market structure
used in this paper is similar with market structures that are used to study information aggregation
properties of prices. Lastly, the current experiment extends the work of Deaves et al. (2008) by
providing individuals with feedback about the accuracy of their signals and the accuracy of signals
of the other traders in their group.
In the current experimental design both overestimation and overplacement can affect trading.
First, overestimation can lead a trader to believe her signal is more accurate than it is. Second,
she can falsely think that the accuracy of her own signal is better than that of the other traders in
the group, causing her to overplace her relative standing. Previous research predicts that both of
these manifestations of overconfidence may lead to more trading and lower profits in the baseline.
Feedback provided in two additional conditions is designed to dampen the effect of overestimation
and overplacement incrementally. In one of the conditions participants receive feedback about
their own accuracy, and in the next condition participants also receive feedback about the accuracy
of the signals of the other traders.
The results confirm the findings in Deaves et al. (2008) that overconfidence leads to higher
trading volume and lower returns. Overestimation leads to higher trading volume and lower profits
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and there is evidence that overplacement has some effect on both trading volume and profits as
well. Comparing the effect of overestimation and overplacement on different conditions I show
that there exists a causal link between overestimation and trading volume and profits. There is also
some evidence that there exists a causal relationship between overplacement and profits.
The overconfidence literature often finds men to be more overconfident than women, but not
always. Regarding any gender differences in the overconfidence level or trading behavior there are
two main findings from this experiment. First, there are no significant differences on the level of
overconfidence between men and women. Second, there is no difference in the trading volume and
on profits between men and women.
Lastly, the paper also contributes to the literature on information aggregation. This strand
of research has concentrated on studying markets where the accuracy of information is common
knowledge and exogenous (Plott and Sunder, 1988; Oprea et al., 2007; and Deck et al., 2013).
While this can be informative, it is important to recognize that in naturally occurring markets the
accuracy of the signals depends on one’s ability to gather and interpret information. In other words
the accuracy of information in naturally occurring markets is endogenous and heterogeneous. The
data from this experiment show that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the market does not aggregate information well when traders do not explicitly know the accuracy of their information. However,
information aggregation improves when traders are given feedback about the accuracy of their
signal, and is reasonably good when traders know their own accuracy and that of others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related literature is presented in Section 3.2 and
experimental design in Section 3.3. Results are presented in Section 3.4 followed by a discussion
of the main results and suggestions for future research in Section 3.5.
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3.2

Literature Review

An extensive body of research has explored the effects of overconfidence on asset trading.
There are several theoretical models that support the link between overconfidence and high trading
volume and low profits. Odean (1998) models trading behavior with agents who are overconfident about the accuracy of their information. The author concludes that overconfidence increases
expected trading volume and lowers expected utility. Gervais and Odean (2001) develop a model
in which agents become overconfident by taking too much credit for their successes and blaming
losses on bad luck. The authors report that overconfident people trade too aggressively, which
leads to increased expected trading volume and lower expected profits (see also Daniel et al.,
2001). Kelly and Tetlock (2013) develop a model with informed rational investors and uninformed
investors. Uninformed investors trade for two reasons, either for hedging or because they are overconfident about the information they have. They find that the model matches the market activity
well and that nearly all uninformed trading can be explained by overconfidence. Lastly, Daniel and
Hirshleifer (2015) also argue that overconfidence is a plausible way to explain excessive trading
patterns.
The evidence that links overconfidence with excessive asset trading extends to empirical research. Barber and Odean (2000) find that households that trade the most, the top 20 percent based
on trading volume, earn 5.5 percent less annually than a value-weighted market index. Since the
overconfidence literature has found overconfident people to trade more, Barber and Odean (2000)
argue that the lower profits for the top 20 percent can be attributed, at least in part, to overconfidence. Glaser and Weber (2007) find that individuals who are overconfident about their investment
skills or past performance trade more. In another paper, Glaser and Weber (2009) report that
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past market and portfolio returns are positively correlated with trading volume. They argue this
is caused by self-attribution bias which makes investors overconfident after high performances of
their portfolio or the market (see also Statman et al., 2006). Using survey data to create a measure of overconfidence, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) conclude that overconfident investors trade
more frequently and have lower returns.
The effects of overconfidence on trading performance have been studied using laboratory experiments as well. Deaves et al. (2008) find that overconfidence leads to more trading and lower
profits. Deaves et al. (2008) use a series of confidence interval questions with specific numeric
answers to calculate a measure of overconfidence (known as calibration-based overconfidence).
The performance on these questions is used to determine the accuracy of the signal a participant
receives in the trading portion of the experiment. The trading was done in a computerized double
auction market environment where participants could post bids and asks or accept existing bids
and asks. Assets traded in this experiment earned some dividend drawn from a uniform distribution. It should be noted that his experiment can only provide evidence of a correlation between
overconfidence and trading behavior since overconfidence is not manipulated in a way that helps
establish a causal relationship.
In the current experiment participants also complete a task, which is used to calculate overconfidence, before trading. This same task is later used to determine the accuracy of the signal
in a given trading period. In this regard the current experiment is similar to Deaves et al. (2008)
since both use task-specific measures of overconfidence. That is to say, both experiments use
overconfidence measures that are designed to influence market behavior. Yet, the studies differ in
three important ways. First, there is no feedback provided in Deaves at al. (2008) at the end of
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the trading periods, while in the current experiment traders, in all conditions, receive performance
feedback at the end of each trading period. In two of the conditions subjects receive additional
feedback about the accuracy of their signal at the beginning of each trading period. Second, the
two studies have different market structures. In Deaves et al. (2008) assets with dividends drawn
from a uniform distribution are traded. In the current experiment assets are either worth zero or
100. This market structure is often used in information aggregation experiments and has shown
to be a reliable market structure to use in asset markets (see below for a detailed discussion of
the literature on the market structure). Third, in Deaves at al. (2008) the accuracy of the signal
is based on the subjects’ performance in confidence interval questions and remains the same for
all trading periods. In the current experiment traders complete a task before each trading period
and the accuracy of the signals depends on their performance on this task. Other experimental
evidence comes from Biais et al. (2005) who use the same environment as Market 7, Series C,
in Plott and Sunder (1988), find that overconfidence lowers trading performance. Lastly, Kirchler
and Maciejovsky (2002) also present experimental evidence of the negative effects overconfidence
has on trading performance.
The literature on overconfidence has also reported gender differences when it comes to overconfidence and trading behavior. Research has found that men tend to be more affected by overconfidence (Lundeberg et al., 1994; Deaux et al., 1977; Estes and Hosseini, 1988). Men are especially
found to be overconfident in those tasks that are perceived to be in the masculine domain (Deaux
and Emswiller, 1974; Lenney, 1977; and Beyer and Bowden, 1997). Motivated by this research
Barber and Odean (2001) find that men tend to trade 45 percent more than women. As a consequence, men earn 2.65 percentage points less per year than if they had held the portfolio they had at
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the beginning of the year while women earn 1.72 percentage points less. However, in more recent
experimental papers there is some evidence that gender does not play a role in trading behavior.
Both Deaves et al. (2008) and Biais et al. (2005) find no evidence of a gender effect on trading behavior. The current paper adds to the existing literature by providing further experimental evidence
of a lack of gender effect in trading behavior.
Given the findings of research to date on the effects of overconfidence on asset markets, it is
important to explore if there exists a causal link between overconfidence and trading behavior. In
order to establish this causal link one would need to manipulate the possibility for a trader to be
overconfident. The existing literature suggests that feedback is a natural instrument one can use
to eliminate the possibility of overconfidence to occur. Past research has shown that people are
well calibrated (their estimates do not experience overconfidence) in tasks with high predictability
and clear, fast feedback. For instance, expert bridge players (Keren, 1987), race-track bettors
(Dowie, 1976; Hausch et al., 1981) and meteorologists (Murphy and Winkler, 1984) tend to be well
calibrated. Feedback has been found to improve decision making (Balzer et al., 1989). Research
has also shown that feedback can improve one’s calibration and lower overconfidence (Pulford and
Colman, 1997; Arkes et al., 1987; Hoch and Loewenstein, 1989; Remus et al., 1996; Eberlin et al.,
2011). Further, Odean (1998) argues that learning is fastest when feedback is quick and clear, but
he points out that in the asset markets feedback is often slow and noisy, which can partly explain
why people are not well calibrated. In the current experiment feedback is used to incrementally
eliminate the possibility for traders to be overconfident.
This experiment has a similar information environment to that in Anderson and Holt (1997)
and Hung and Plott (2001). In both of these papers subjects guessed which of two urns was used
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based on a ball that was drawn from one. Each of the urns contained three balls: Urn A contained
two white balls and one black ball while Urn B contained two black balls and one white. Thus,
if the only information one has is the color of a single draw and each urn is equally likely to be
used, then there is a 2/3 chance the urn containing two balls of the drawn color was used. This
information environment has subsequently been used to study the aggregative properties of market
prices. For example, in Oprea et al. (2007) and Deck et al. (2013) participants trade assets that
can either have a value of zero or a value of 100. Each participant is given a signal drawn from
{0, 0, 100} if the true value of the asset was zero and {0, 100, 100} if the value of the asset was
100. In these designs each trader has the same accuracy of information, that is 2/3 of the time the
signal is correct. In the current design a similar asset market structure is used. Participants trade
assets that can have a value of zero or 100 and receive signals about the value of the assets they
own. The difference in the current paper is that the accuracy of the signals for each participant
depends on the performance on the task that is completed before each trading period. This means
that different participants will have different levels of accuracy for their signals, which is different
from Oprea et al. (2007) and Deck et al. (2013). Hence, the current experimental design allows
one to explore how markets aggregate information when the accuracy of information is endogenous
and heterogeneous. The first to examine how markets aggregate information in a laboratory setting
was Plott and Sunder (1988). Their main finding was that the markets were able to identify the
state of the world. More recent research finds that prices correlate with the Bayesian predictions,
even though they do not fully aggregate information (Oprea et al., 2007, and Deck et al., 2013).
The current experiment adds to the existing literature by providing experimental evidence on the
aggregative properties of prices when the accuracy of information depends on one’s ability and is
thus heterogeneous.
66

3.3

Experimental Design

The study is composed of three conditions, designed to first establish the link between overconfidence and trading behavior and explore how feedback can mitigate the effects of overconfidence on asset markets. Each condition is structured in the same general format with three stages.
The three stages are: I. Overconfidence Elicitation, II. Trading, III. Second Overconfidence Elicitation. The only difference between conditions is in Stage II of the experiment. The first subsection
describes the task used to elicit overconfidence and how the overconfidence measures are calculated. The second subsection explains the market structure in Stage II and each condition. The third
subsection is a summary of the procedures followed in the experiment, and the last subsection lays
out the hypothesis that will be tested.

3.3.1

Measures of Overconfidence

Participants’ overconfidence is elicited in two different stages, I and III, each composed of
10 paid periods. Both overestimation and overplacement are elicited in both stages. The second
elicitation in Stage III is done to investigate if participants’ overconfidence changes after they
receive feedback in Stage II. The overconfidence elicitation is based on Bregu and Forbes (2015).
Participants are shown a matrix with 100 rectangles with six different colors. Each participant is
given seven seconds to count the number of red rectangles before they move to a new screen.1
On the next screen, participants enter their guess of the number of red rectangles. After this, two
follow up questions are asked to capture the two different forms of overconfidence: overestimation
1

The time was determined based on a pilot. The goal was to create uncertainty on the part of
participants. Seven seconds was found not to provide enough time for the participants to count
every red rectangle, but was enough time to form an educated guess.
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and overplacement.
The first question is: “How close were you to the true number of red rectangles?” There are
several options, shown in Table 1, from which a subject can choose. This question is used to elicit
one’s level of overestimation. In any given period a participant can overestimate, underestimate
or answer correctly. Overestimation occurs when one states that she is closer to the true number
of red rectangles than she actually is. Underestimation occurs when one states that she is further
away from the true number of red rectangles than what she actually is. Lastly, if a participant
states the correct distance from the true number of rectangles than she neither overestimates nor
underestimates her performance. To calculate the overestimation measure the number of periods
a participant underestimated her ability is subtracted from the number of periods the participant
overestimated her ability. This measure ranges from negative ten to positive ten. A positive overestimation value means the participant is overconfident, a negative value means the participant is
underconfident, and a value of zero means the participant is well calibrated (neither overconfident nor underconfident).2 I refer to overestimation elicited in Stage I as Overestimation-1, and to
overestimation elicited in Stage III as Overestimation-3.
2

There is some concern that the overestimation task used here is affected by risk preferences.
Using the data from Bregu et al. (2017), who elicit risk behavior and overestimation using the task
used in this paper, I find no significant relationship between overestimation and risk preferences.
Lastly, while this may add some noise this should not matter since the same task is used in all
conditions.
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Table 1: Question one Options
Options

Payoff

Exact

$33

Within 1

$30

Within 2

$27

Within 3

$24

Within 4

$21

Within 5

$18

Within 6

$15

Within 7

$12

Within 8

$9

Within 9

$6

Guaranteed

$3

To elicit overplacement, participants are asked: “How many of the other four people in your
group were closer to the true number of red rectangles than you?” If a participant answers this
question correctly she receives two dollars. A participant overplaces her ability when she states
that the number of people who are closer than her is lower than the actual number of people
who are closer. A participant underplaces her performance if the number of participants who are
reported to be closer is greater than the true number of participants who are closer. There are two
measures of overplacement: Overplacement-1, which is calculated based on the data from Stage I
and Overplacement-3 is calculated based on the data from Stage III. The overplacement measures
are calculated in the same way as overestimation. Hence, overplacement ranges from negative ten
to positive ten, and a measure of zero indicates that the answers of the participant are not biased.
There is no feedback given at the end of each period of Stage I and Stage III, so participants
cannot learn about their performance or the performance of others. Yet, the feedback that is provided in Stage II may affect the level of overconfidence in Stage III. For this reason the measures
of overconfidence from Stage I are used in the analysis.
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3.3.2

Market Structure and Trading Information

At the beginning of each period in Stage II, participants complete a counting task as in Stage I,
but are not asked to rate their accuracy or the accuracy of others. Instead, after guessing the number
of red rectangles participants trade in a double auction market for 120 seconds. Each participant
is given three assets and 300 tokens at the beginning of each of the ten trading sessions, and they
are told that the value of each asset is either zero or 100 tokens with equal chance. Participants are
also informed that the value of the asset is the same for everyone in the group and that tokens are
converted to dollars at a ratio of one dollar for 20 tokens.
The true value of the asset is not known by participants while they trade, but each participant
receives a signal about the value of the asset, which is referred to as “news” in the experiment.
The signal about the value of the asset appears on the top left corner of the trading screen for the
entire duration of each trading period (see the Appendix). Participants know that the accuracy of
the signal depends on their performance on the counting task completed at the beginning of that
period. Table 2 shows the level of accuracy of the signal based on the difference between the true
number of red rectangles and a participant’s guess. A similar table is provided to each participant.
Part of the negative effect of overconfidence on profits has been attributed to transaction costs. To
allow transaction costs to play a role in trading performance a three-token fee for each asset bought
or sold is implemented.3
3

Barber and Odean (2001) report that the average trade in excess of $1,000 incurs a round-trip
cost of 2.4%. The transaction cost in the experiment is scaled up to account for the big difference between the true value of the assets and transaction prices that have been found in similar
experiments (see Oprea et al., 2007, and Deck et al., 2013).
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Table 2: Accuracy of the signal
Difference Between Guess and
True Number of Red Rectangles
3 or less

Accuracy
95%

4, 5, 6

80%

7, 8, 9

65%

more than 9

50%

The experiment is composed of three conditions. The Baseline condition is designed to test
the effect of overconfidence on trading behavior. The next two conditions are designed to assess the
role feedback can play in limiting the negative consequences of overconfidence on asset markets.
The difference among conditions is in what feedback, about the performance in the counting task
in a given period of Stage II, is provided to participants. In the Baseline a participant only receives
the signal about the value of the asset at the beginning of each trading period. Because the accuracy
of the signal depends on the performance on the counting task a participant who is overconfident
about her performance in the counting task will also be overconfident about the accuracy of her
signal. In the current experimental design overconfidence can affect trading behavior in two ways:
through an overestimation of one’s accuracy of information and through an overplacement of one’s
accuracy of information.
To eliminate the possibility for one to overestimate the accuracy of information, in the second
condition participants are given the accuracy with which their own signal is generated in addition
to the signal itself. Both the signal and the accuracy of the signal are provided to participants at
the beginning of each trading period. Since participants in this condition know only their own
accuracy, this condition is referred to as the Own Accuracy Treatment. Participants in this condition know exactly what their signal accuracy is, so they cannot overestimate the accuracy of their
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information. Yet, in this condition one can still overplace the relative accuracy of her signal.
The last condition is designed to eliminate both overestimation and overplacement of one’s
signal accuracy. To achieve this, participants are shown their own accuracy and the accuracies of
the other four group members in addition to their signal. It should be noted that participants do
not know the signals of the other four people; they know only the accuracy with which each of
these signals are generated. This condition is referred to as the Full Accuracy Treatment since
participants receive full feedback with regard to the accuracy of the information in their group. In
this condition both overestimation and overplacement are eliminated and neither should have any
effect on trading behavior. Thus the difference between Baseline and the Own Accuracy Treatment
can be attributed to overestimation while the difference between the Own Accuracy Treatment and
Full Accuracy Treatment can be attributed to overplacement.
At the end of each trading period participants received feedback about their performance in
that period. In all conditions participants see: the true value of the asset, their signal about the
value of the asset, the number of assets held at the end of trading, the number of tokens held at the
end of trading, and the total value of the assets and tokens converted to dollars (see the Appendix).
In addition to these, in the conditions where feedback is provided participants see the accuracy of
their signal.
Lastly, under this setup and before receiving any information, a participant’s expected value
for the asset is equal to 50. After receiving a signal, the participant can estimate the expected value
based on her belief about how accurate the signal is. For example, if a participant receives a signal
that the value of the asset is zero and she thinks this signal is 65% accurate, then the expected
value, before trading starts, is equal to 35 tokens.
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If markets perfectly aggregate information then one would expect the price of the asset to be
equal to the Bayesian expected value, which is calculated based on the signals and accuracies of
the five participants in the market. For instance, if four participants receive signals that the value
of the asset is 100 with accuracies 50%, 65%, 80%, and 95% and one receives a signal of zero with
95% accuracy the Bayesian price would be 88.14 tokens. In other words, this would be the value
of the asset if one saw all five signals and the accuracy with which each signal was generated.

3.3.3

Procedures

The experiment was conducted at the Behavioral Business Research Lab (BBRL) at the University of Arkansas. The experiment was coded and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Participants were informed in the instructions that they would get paid for one randomly selected
period completed in Stage I, II or III. Participants earned a show-up fee of $7.50 and were paid
an additional $13.93 on average. Participants were randomly separated into fixed groups of five,
which only interacted during the trading activity.
A total of 95 participants were recruited for the 90-minute study run across nine sessions.
Eight of these sessions were composed of ten participants, and one was composed of 15 participants. A group of five participants is dropped from the analysis because one of the participants
showed complete lack of understanding of the instructions. The participant consistently bought
at higher prices and sold at lower prices. A set of written instructions was given to each participant, and after participants were seated the experimenter read the instructions for Stage I aloud.
The experimenter answered any questions participants had during the reading of the instructions.
Before starting with the experiment participants were informed that they would first answer two
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comprehension questions and complete a practice period before starting with the ten paid periods
of Stage I.
Once participants finished with Stage I of the experiment the experimenter read the rest of
the instructions. Before participants started the trading stage they answered two comprehension
questions and completed three practice periods to familiarize themselves with the trading platform.
Participants completed ten paid trading periods; then they started with Stage III of the experiment.
In Stage III participants, in all conditions, completed another ten periods identical to those in Stage
I.
Recent experimental evidence shows that being able to infer others’ information based on
asset prices requires high cognitive reflection skills (see Corgnet et al., 2015). Hence, market
outcomes in the current experiment may be affected by one’s level of cognitive reflection. After
Stage III an incentivized cognitive reflection test (CRT) composed of seven questions developed
by Toplak et al. (2014) is used to elicit participants’ cognitive reflection. Participants received one
dollar for each correct question and the payoff from these questions is added to the random payoff
chosen from Stage I, II, or III. Lastly, subjects answered a short survey, designed to collect demographic information and information about the use of the feedback in Stage II of the experiment,
at the end of the experiment (see the Appendix).

3.3.4

Hypotheses

This section summarizes the hypotheses that will be tested. First, the literature on overconfidence argues that overconfidence leads to higher trading volume. Hence, one would expect the
two measures of overconfidence to be positively correlated with the number of assets traded in
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the Baseline. Second, overconfidence has been linked to lower profits. If this is the case, both
overconfidence measures should be negatively correlated with profits in the Baseline.
Hypothesis 1: Overestimation and overplacement lead to higher trading volume in the Baseline.
Hypothesis 2: Overestimation and overplacement lead to lower profits in the Baseline.
The feedback provided to participants in the Own Accuracy Treatment eliminates the possibility to overestimate their accuracy of information. Hence, one would expect overestimation to
play no role in the trading volume or profits for this condition. In the Full Accuracy Treatment
participants can neither overestimate nor overplace the accuracy of their information, which means
neither overconfidence measure can have an effect on trading volume or profits.
Hypothesis 1a: Feedback eliminates the effect of overestimation on higher trading volume in
the Own Accuracy Treatment.
Hypothesis 1b: Feedback eliminates the effect of overestimation and overplacement on trading volume in the Full Accuracy Treatment.
Hypothesis 2a: Feedback eliminates the negative effect of overestimation on profits in the
Own Accuracy Treatment.
Hypothesis 2b: Feedback eliminates the negative effect of overestimation and overplacement
on profits in the Full Accuracy Treatment.
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3.4

Results

3.4.1

Summary Statistics and Measures of Overconfidence

The data consist of the choices of 90 participants, 30 in each condition. Table 1 presents
summary statistics for the CRT and the demographic survey. The variable Math & Stat Classes
is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken. Trading Experience is based
on the data from the survey where each participant stated her trading experience ranging from no
trading experience (1) to professional trader (5). The last three columns in Table 1 report the pvalue resulting from t-tests for the differences of the means between conditions. As can be seen
from Table 1, the only statistical difference, at the 5% level, is the one on age between the Own
Accuracy Treatment and the Full Accuracy Treatment.
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the overconfidence measures and trading activity. The
only statistical difference between conditions regarding overconfidence measure is that between
the Own Accuracy Treatment and Full Accuracy Treatment for Overestimation-1. All the other ttests yield a p-value greater than ten percent. In terms of the number of assets traded, participants in
the Own Accuracy Treatment traded significantly less than participants in the other two conditions.
The variable Signal Accuracy in Table 3 shows the accuracy level (50%, 65%, 80%, or 90%) for
each condition. As is apparent from the last three columns Signal Accuracy does not statistically
differ for any condition pair. This shows that participants in each condition had similar counting
abilities.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for each condition. The p-values reported in the last
three columns come from t-tests on the differences between conditions.
Own
Full
p-value
p-value
Variables
Baseline Accuracy
Accuracy
Col. 1 vs. Col. 1 vs.
Treatment Treatment Col. 2
Col. 3
Men
43.33%
63.33%
56.67%
0.119
0.304
21.87
20.60
21.90
0.069
0.963
Age
Math & Stat Classes 3.63
3.47
3.17
0.824
0.345
1.40
1.47
1.63
0.681
0.244
Trading Experience
CRT
1.77
1.90
1.50
0.739
0.513

p-value
Col. 2 vs.
Col. 3
0.600
0.006
0.666
0.431
0.377

Table 4: Overconfidence Measures and Trading
Summary statistics of the main overconfidence measures and trading activity.
The p-values reported in the last three columns come from t-tests on the differences between conditions.
Stage

Variables

Baseline

Own
Accuracy
Treatment

Full
Accuracy
Treatment

p-value
Col. 1 vs.
Col. 2

p-value
Col. 1 vs.
Col. 3

p-value
Col. 2 vs.
Col. 3

Overestimation-1
Max
Min

0.10 [5.54]
8
-10

-2.03 [4.63]
8
-10

0.70 [4.96]
9
-10

0.112

0.660

0.032

Overplacement-1
Max
Min

0.77 [4.33]
9
-9

0.80 [3.63]
10
-4

0.47 [5.24]
10
-10

0.977

0.810

0.778

Assets Traded
Max
Min
Signal Accuracy

4.51 [2.08]
8.6
0.3
79% [17%]

2.90 [1.21]
5.5
0
81% [16%]

3.84 [1.62]
9
1.9
78% [18%]

0.001

0.169

0.014

0.641

0.826

0.498

Overestimation-3
Max
Min

0.40 [5.42]
10
-10

-2.13 [4.56]
7
-10

-0.53 [5.82]
10
-10

0.055

0.524

0.241

Overplacement-3
Max
Min

0.73 [3.81]
7
-8

1.17 [4.48]
10
-7

-0.20 [5.68]
10
-8

0.684

0.459

0.304

Stage I

Stage II

Stage III

Standard deviations shown in brackets.

A t-test reveals that Overestimation-1 is not different from zero for the Baseline and Full
Accuracy Treatment (p-value = 0.922 and p-value = 0.446 respectively). This shows that taken
as a whole participants neither overestimated nor underestimated their performance in Stage I in
these two conditions. Overestimation-1 is significantly different from zero for the Own Accuracy
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Treatment (p-value = 0.023). Hence, participants in the Own Accuracy Treatment underestimate
their abilities. While the conditions overall do not appear overconfident 42 out of the total of
90 participants have a positive Overestimation-1 measure, which indicates they are overconfident.
Overplacement-1 is not significantly different from zero for any of the conditions, yet 45 out of 90
participants overplaced their ability. Hence while the average participant in each condition is not
overconfident there are individuals in all conditions that are overconfident. If overconfidence affects trading one would expect these individuals to behave differently. Based on existing literature,
one would expect overconfident participants to trade more and earn lower profits.

3.4.2

Overconfidence and Trading Volume

Past research argues that overconfidence about one’s accuracy of information leads to high
trading volume in asset markets. If this is true one would expect to find a positive effect of overconfidence on the trading volume for the Baseline. Table 5 presents regression results for each condition. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and include group dummies. The results
in Table 5 column one show that Overestimation-1 leads to higher trading in the Baseline. This
confirms previous findings which link overestimation with high trading volume. Overplacement-1
also has a positive and statistically significant effect on trading volume for the Baseline and the
Own Accuracy Treatment (columns four and five).
Result 1: Overestimation leads to higher trading volume in the Baseline and overplacement
leads to higher trading volume in the Baseline and the Own Accuracy Treatment.
The main purpose of this paper is to establish a causal link between overconfidence and trading behavior. Since, feedback eliminates the possibility for subjects to be overconfident one would
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expect to find no significant effect of Overestimation-1 in the Own Accuracy Treatment and the
Full Accuracy Treatment. As can be seen in Table 5 Overestimation-1 does not have a statistically
significant effect on trading volume in the Own Accuracy Treatment and Full Accuracy Treatment,
which indicates that there exists a causal link between overconfidence and trading volume. Subjects received feedback about the accuracy of the other four group members in the Full Accuracy
Treatment hence Overplacement-1 should not play a role in trading volume for this treatment. The
results (Table 5 column six) confirm that when participants are offered feedback about the accuracy of their group members Overplacement-1 does not have a statistically significant effect on
trading volume. This shows that feedback successfully eliminates any effect of Overestimation-1
and Overplacement-1 have on trading.
Result 1a: Feedback eliminates the effect of overestimation on higher trading volume in the
Own Accuracy Treatment.
Result 1b: Feedback eliminates the effect of overestimation and overplacement on trading
volume in the Full Accuracy Treatment.
The existing literature argues that gender plays an important role in trading behavior. In fact,
Barber and Odean (2001) split the data in two groups based on gender and find that men trade more
than women, which they attribute in part to the higher level of overconfidence that men have been
found to have in fields similar to trading. In the current experiment there is no evidence that men are
more overconfident than women based on Overestimation-1 (p-value=0.972) or Overplacement-1
(p-value=0.298). More importantly, contrary to the findings of Barber and Odean (2001) men do
not trade more than women in any of the conditions. On the contrary, there is some evidence that
men trade less when they know the accuracy of their own information
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Table 5: Overconfidence and Trading Volume
The dependent variable is the number of trades a participant completed
in one period. OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.
Own
Full
Own
Full
Variables
Baseline Accuracy
Accuracy
Baseline Accuracy
Accuracy
Treatment Treatment
Treatment Treatment
Overestimation-1
0.175*** 0.076
-0.004
[0.045]
[0.052]
[0.037]
0.147**
0.117**
0.046
Overplacement-1
[0.072]
[0.045]
[0.035]
0.035
-0.509*
-0.484***
0.162
-0.609**
-0.500***
Age
[0.070]
[0.267]
[0.176]
[0.100]
[0.245]
[0.170]
-0.746
-0.905**
0.535
-0.976
-0.948**
0.686
Male
[0.656]
[0.422]
[0.427]
[0.723]
[0.422]
[0.447]
0.059
0.482*
0.148
0.135
0.551**
Math & Stat Classes 0.205
[0.151]
[0.093]
[0.241]
[0.157]
[0.104]
[0.229]
Trading Experience
-0.059
0.214
-0.201
-0.101
0.231
-0.228
[0.439]
[0.372]
[0.204]
[0.803]
[0.347]
[0.198]
0.154
0.074
0.376
0.177
0.083
0.383**
CRT
[0.183]
[0.127]
[0.199]
[0.240]
[0.113]
[0.175]
Signal Accuracy
0.446
-0.972
-0.649
0.503
-0.708
-0.532
[1.090]
[0.550]
[0.668]
[1.113]
[1.222]
[0.593]
Group Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Constant
0.237
14.635**
3.200***
-2.919
15.959**
12.014***
[1.636]
[6.002]
[0.234]
[2.149]
[5.305]
[2.947]
R-squared
0.343
0.120
0.145
0.304
0.130
0.224
Observations
300
300
300
300
300
300
Standard errors given in brackets. Two-tailed p-values: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken.
Trading Experience is the reported trading experience by subjects on a scale of one to five with one
being no experience and five being professional trader. CRT is the number of correct CRT questions.
Signal Accuracy is how accurate the signal was for a given participant in that period (50%, 65%, 80%
or 95%).

(columns two and five in Table 5). Age also does not have a significant effect on trading
volume in the Baseline, but it has a significant negative effect on the two conditions where feedback
is provided. Older participants traded fewer assets in the Own Accuracy Treatment and the Full
Accuracy Treatment. The number of math and statistics classes one has taken has a significant
and positive effect on trading volume for the Full Accuracy Treatment, but not for the other two
conditions. Cognitive reflection skills have been shown to play a role on the ability to infer others’
information based on prices (Corgnet et al., 2015). In this experiment CRT only plays a marginally
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significant role in the Full Accuracy Treatment (column six in Table 5).

3.4.3

Overconfidence and Profits

Researchers have argued that people who are overconfident tend to trade more and as a consequence earn lower profits. The lower profits are attributed to the transaction costs (Barber and
Odean, 2000) and the disposition effect (Chen et al., 2007).4 Table 6 presents regression results
of the effect of Overestimation-1 and Overplacement-1 on profits. The dependent variable in Table 6 is the Bayesian net profit. The profits one earns in this experiment may be affected by the
realization of the asset value. The different markets across conditions have different levels of accuracies, which translates to different realizations of asset values. Hence it is possible that one
properly infers the value of the asset based on her signal and the prices, but the realization of the
asset value is not what is expected. To control for this, the profits are calculated using the value of
the asset based on the Bayesian expected value. Bayesian net profits are calculated by multiplying
the Bayesian expected value by the number of assets one has at the end of the period plus tokens
at the end of the period. The total is divided by 20 to convert the value to dollars.
If overconfidence leads to lower profits, then one would expect Overestimation-1, Overplacement-1 or both to be negatively correlated with profits for the Baseline. If overconfidence leads
to lower trading profits and feedback is successful in eliminating this effect, one would expect
no significant effect of Overestimation-1 in the Own Accuracy Treatment and no effect of either
overconfidence measure in the Full Accuracy Treatment. Note, the Bayesian net profits account
for any transaction costs a trader incurred during that period since traders pay the transaction cost
4

The disposition effect refers to the tendency for people to hold stocks that have depreciated
and sell stocks that have appreciated.
81

each time they buy or sell, and this is reflected in the amount of tokens one has at the end of
the period. The regression results, in Table 6, show that there exists a negative and significant
relationship between Overestimation-1 and trading profits for the Baseline only. This indicates
that there exists a causal link between Overestimation-1 and trading profits. On the other hand,
there is no significant effect of Overplacement-1 on trading profits.
Result 2: Overestimation leads to significantly lower profits in the Baseline, but overplacement does not.
Result 2a: Feedback eleminates the effect of overestimation in the Own Accuracy treatment.
Result 2b: Feedback eleminates the effect of overestimation in the Full Accuracy treatment.
Lastly, there is disagreement in previous research about the effect of gender on trading profits.
Barber and Odean (2001) find that men trade more and have lower returns than women. But
experimental studies have found no effect of gender on profits (Biais et al., 2005 and Deaves at al.,
2008). The results from Table 6 show that men earn significantly higher profits in the Baseline.
This finding appears contrary to previous findings that find men earn lower or similar profits with
women. To examine the effect of gender on profits a new set of regressions with gender and
interaction terms of gender and each overconfidence measure for all three conditions are conducted.
These regressions show that men who overestimated their accuracy of information do not earn
statistically lower profits for any of the conditions. On the other hand, men who overplaced their
accuracy of information earn statistically significantly lower profits in the Baseline (see Table 2 in
the Appendix).
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Table 6: Overconfidence and Profits
The dependent variable is the net profit (in dollars) in a period when the value of the asset is the
Bayesian expected value. OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.
Own
Full
Own
Full
Baseline
Accuracy
Accuracy
Baseline
Accuracy
Accuracy
Variables
Treatment Treatment
Treatment Treatment
Overestimation-1
-0.177**
-0.147
-0.061
[0.084]
[0.139]
[0.091]
-0.151
-0.076
-0.012
Overplacement-1
[0.125]
[0.118]
[0.068]
Age
0.311
0.060*
0.268
0.162
-0.055
0.254
[0.206]
[0.585]
[0.204]
[0.229]
[0.604]
[0.206]
Male
2.698**
-0.252
-0.450
2.931**
-0.316
-0.361
[1.298]
[1.082]
[0.649]
[1.370]
[1.202]
[0.712]
0.074
-0.814**
-0.411**
0.068
-0.765**
Math & Stat Classes -0.467**
[0.176]
[0.237]
[0.334]
[0.192]
[0.254]
[0.317]
Trading Experience
-1.247
0.049
-0.194
-1.187
0.036
-0.328
[1.414]
[0.830]
[0.581]
[1.600]
[0.838]
[0.571]
CRT
0.208
0.326
0.065
0.180
0.239
0.147
[0.463]
[0.410]
[0.293]
[0.436]
[0.385]
[0.241]
Signal Accuracy
2.593
7.739*
1.063
2.604
7.985*
1.336
[2.417]
[4.263]
[3.904]
[2.514]
[4.248]
[3.728]
Asset Value
3.492**
1.403
1.955*
3.430**
1.345
1.960*
[1.304]
[1.542]
[1.003]
[1.289]
[1.555]
[1.072]
Group Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Constant
14.323*** 14.395
15.295**
17.540*** 17.413
15.139**
[4.040]
[11.827]
[5.988]
[4.662]
[12.044]
[5.970]
R-squared
0.343
0.088
0.166
0.118
0.085
0.165
Observations
300
300
300
300
300
300
Standard errors given in brackets. Two-tailed p-values: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken. Trading
Experience is the reported trading experience by subjects on a scale of one to five with one being no
experience and five being professional trader. CRT is the number of correct CRT questions. Signal
Accuracy is how accurate the signal was for a given participant in that period (50%, 65%, 80% or 95%).

3.4.4

The Causal Link of Overconfidence and Trading Behavior

To show further support that there exists a causal link between overconfidence and trading
behavior a new set of regression is presented in Table 7. The regressions here include the data
for all conditions with the Full Accuracy Treatment as the omitted condition. If overconfidence
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affects subjects’ behavior differently then the interaction term of the overconfidence measures and
the Baseline condition should be significant. Moreover, since one would expect these overconfidence measures to lead to higher trading volume and lower profits the hypothesis being tested is
one sided. Hence the results in Table 7 show that there exists a causal relationship between overestimation and trading volume (one-tailed p-value = 0.001 for the interaction term Overestimation-1
∗ Baseline). There is also some weak evidence that there exists a causal relationship between
overestimation and profits (one-tailed p-value = 0.096 for the interaction term Overestimation-1 ∗
Baseline). On the other hand, overplacement only has a marginal effect on profits but not on trading
volume in the Baseline. One-tailed p-value for the interaction term Overplacement-1 ∗ Baseline in
column two is 0.157 while for profits (column four) the one-tailed p-value is equal to 0.083. These
results presented in this section provide evidence that there exists a causal relationship between
overestimation and trading behavior and that there exists some evidence of a casual relationship
between overplacement and trading profits.

3.4.5

The Effect of Feedback on Overconfidence

Because Stage III replicated Stage I, in addition to exploring the effect of feedback on trading
behavior, one can examine the effect of feedback on the level of overconfidence as well. The data in
Table 3 show that overall, participants are not overconfident in fact in the Own Accuracy Treatment
participants are slightly underconfident. Yet, there are individuals who are either overconfident
or underconfident, and if feedback helps one learn about her ability, one would expect to find a
lower variance of overconfidence in Stage III than in Stage I of the experiment. In other words,
participants will become better calibrated if they learn about their ability from the feedback given.
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Table 7: Overconfidence Effects on Trading Volume and Profits
The dependent variable is the number of assets traded in a period (first two columns) and Bayesian net
profit in a period (last two columns). OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by participant.
Trading Volume
Profits
-0.042
-0.007
Overestimation-1
[0.040]
[0.084]
0.005
0.061
Overplacement-1
[0.047]
[0.066]
0.455
-0.280
-0.096
0.811
Baseline
[1.050]
[1.246]
[2.078]
[1.975]
0.220***
-0.157
Overestimation-1 ∗ Baseline
[0.061]
[0.120]
0.086
-0.182
Overplacement-1 ∗ Baseline
[0.085]
[0.130]
-1.816*
-1.889*
6.851***
7.415***
Own Accuracy Treatment
[1.068]
[1.019]
[1.670]
[1.747]
-0.120
Overestimation-1 ∗ Own Accuracy Treatment 0.058
[0.063]
[0.150]
0.055
-0.193
Overplacement-1 ∗ Own Accuracy Treatment
[0.070]
[0.122]
-0.077
0.007
0.165
0.084
Age
[0.070]
[0.094]
[0.142]
[0.124]
-0.400
-0.451
0.382
0.577
Male
[0.308]
[0.320]
[0.523]
[0.569]
0.017
-0.020
-0.099
-0.084
Math & Stat Classes
[0.064]
[0.067]
[0.176]
[0.110]
0.065
0.091
-0.424
-0.441
Trading Experience
[0.158]
[0.171]
[0.472]
[0.467]
0.199*
0.205*
0.150
0.129
CRT
[0.102]
[0.110]
[0.192]
[0.189]
-0.286
-0.170
4.259**
4.235**
Signal Accuracy
[0.621]
[0.658]
[2.042]
[2.045]
2.232***
2.217***
Asset Value
[0.763]
[0.777]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Group Controls
6.276***
4.437*
8.521**
10.076
Constant
[2.108]
[2.391]
[4.018]
[3.765]
0.247
0.223
0.114
0.113
R-squared
900
900
900
900
Observations
Standard errors given in brackets. Two-tailed p-values: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Baseline is a dummy that is one for the Baseline condition and zero for the other two conditions.
Overestimation-1 ∗ Baseline is the interaction term of Overestimation-1 with the Baseline dummy. Own
Accuracy Treatment is a dummy that is one for the Own Accuracy Treatment condition and zero for the
other two conditions. Overestimation-1 ∗ Own Accuracy Treatment is the interaction term of
Overestimation-1 with the Own Accuracy Treatment dummy. Overplacement-1 ∗ Baseline is the is the
interaction of Overplacement-1 with the Baseline dummy. Overplacement-1 ∗ Own Accuracy Treatment
is the interaction term of Overplacement-1 with the Own Accuracy Treatment dummy. Math & Stat
Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken. Trading Experience is the
reported trading experience by subjects on a scale of one to five with one being no experience and five
being professional trader. CRT is the number of correct CRT questions. Signal Accuracy is how
accurate the signal was for a given participant in that period (50%, 65%, 80% or 95%).
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To examine if participants became better calibrated in Stage III an F-test for differences in variances
is conducted. The F-test shows that there is no statistical difference in the variance between Stage I
and Stage III for overestimation or overplacement in any of the conditions. This finding is contrary
to previous research that finds feedback to be useful in helping people be better calibrated (Pulford
and Colman, 1997; Arkes et al., 1987; Hoch and Loewenstein, 1989; Remus et al., 1996; Eberlein
et al., 2011).

3.4.6

Information Aggregation

The current experimental design also provides the opportunity to investigate information aggregation when the accuracy of information is endogenous and heterogeneous. In Figures 1-3 the
average observed price (the average price of all trades in a period) is plotted against the Bayesian
expected value. If the market aggregates information well, one would expect to find the data concentrated on the 45-degree line. The first observation from the graphs shows that traders do not
aggregate information well. Yet, moving from the Baseline to the Full Accuracy Treatment it
becomes clear that the graphs get closer to what one would expect them to be if information is
perfectly aggregated. Table 8 shows that the market in the Baseline fails to distinguish between
the two states of the world. The price is close to 50 tokens regardless of the true state of the world.
However, as participants gain information about the signal accuracy the average observed prices
move closer to the true state of the world.
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Table 8: Summary statistics for each condition.
Baseline
True Asset Value

Own Accuracy

Full Accuracy

Treatment

Treatment

0

100

0

100

0

100

Bayesian Expected Value

6.2 [17.3]

92.8 [19.6]

5.3 [16.6]

92.5 [20.8]

8.5 [25.0]

96.2 [7.6]

Average Observed Price

49.6 [16.7]

50.5 [19.3]

41.9 [18.6]

53.2 [18.0]

36.0[19.8]

60.0 [15.0]

Standard deviations in brackets.

Figure 1: Baseline
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Figure 2: Own Accuracy Treatment

Figure 3: Full Accuracy Treatment
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To explore information aggregation in more detail a set of regressions, is conducted with
the variable Bayesian expected value as the dependent value and the Average observed prices
as the independent variable is conducted. These regression results are shown in Table 9 for each
condition separately. As can be seen, the Average observed price only has explanatory power in the
Own Accuracy Treatment and the Full Accuracy Treatment. The results from the Own Accuracy
Treatment and the Full Accuracy Treatment are qualitatively similar to previous studies which use
a similar market structure (see Oprea et al., 2007, and Deck et al., 2013).
Previous research has found that information aggregation is in part explained by excess bids
(Deck et al., 2013). Excess bids are the number of bids minus the number of asks at the end
of a period. As a robustness check, the last three columns in Table 9 report regression results
controlling for excess bids. There are no qualitative changes in the effect of average prices on
the Bayesian expected value in this set of regressions. Average observed prices are still positively
correlated with Bayesian expected values and significant for both the Own Accuracy Treatment
and the Full Accuracy Treatment. Excess bids are significant and positive for the Baseline and the
Own Accuracy Treatment but not for the Full Accuracy Treatment. This shows that in the Baseline
and Own Accuracy Treatment excess bids carry information regarding the value of the asset, but
not in the Full Accuracy Treatment. The positive coefficient on excess bids indicates the value of
the asset is high when there are more standing bids than standing asks.5
5

The results presented here remain qualitatively similar when closing price is used instead
of average price. The only exception is that prices are not significantly correlated with Bayesian
expected value for the Own Accuracy Treatment when closing price is used as the independent
variable (see the Appendix).
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Table 9: Information Aggregation
The dependent variable is the Bayesian expected value in a given period.
OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by group.

Variables

Average observed price

Own

Full

Accuracy

Accuracy

Treatment

Treatment

0.219

0.949**

1.403***

[0.381]

[0.334]

[0.116]

Baseline

Excess bids

Constant

R-squared

Own

Full

Accuracy

Accuracy

Treatment

Treatment

0.047

0.385*

1.360***

[0.332]

[0.173]

[0.164]

2.818***

2.355**

0.433

[0.412]

[0.791]

[0.459]

Baseline

37.048*

3.780

-14.975**

66.706***

50.232***

-11.790

[18.275]

[19.003]

[5.650]

[14.325]

[10.557]

[9.772]

0.007

0.143

0.385

0.149

0.278

0.390

60

60

a

Observations
60
60
60
60
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01

a. There are 10 observations for each group of five and for each condition there are six groups

3.5

Discussion

A lab experiment is used to establish causal link between overconfidence and trading behavior. Both overestimation and overplacement are significantly correlated with trading volume but
the data shows that only the effect of overestimation is different in the Baseline from the other two
treatments. On the other hand, the results show that there exists a causal link between both overconfidence measures and profits. This findings complement previous theoretical and experimental
research which claims it is through an overestimation of one’s knowledge that overconfidence affects trading behavior (Odean, 1998 and Deaves et al., 2008; and Glaser and Weber, 2007).
Several studies (Deaux et al., 1977; Estes and Hosseini, 1988; and Lundeberg et al., 1994)
have shown that men tend to be more overconfident than women, but more recent studies report
no gender differences on the level of overconfidence (Biais et al., 2005, and Deaves et al., 2008).
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In this experiment there are no gender differences for either measure of overconfidence. One
possible explanation for this could be that gender differences highly depend on the type of the
task (Deaux et al., 1977 and Lundeberg et al., 1994). Other research has shown that men tend to
be more overconfident when the tasks are in the masculine domain (Deaux and Emswiller 1974;
Lenney, 1977; and Bowden 1997). In this experiment traders faced a counting task which can be
considered gender-neutral. Hence, the lack of gender difference in the level of overconfidence can
be attributed, at least in part, to the task employed here.
Information aggregation when the accuracy of the signals is heterogeneous and endogenous
was also explored in this experiment. While in previous experiments on information aggregation
signals have had exogenous accuracy, in naturally occurring markets this is not the case. In naturally occurring markets the quality of information depends on the ability of individuals to gather
and interpret information. In this aspect the current experiment is more similar to the naturally
occurring markets than previous experiments. The modest success of the markets to aggregate
information in the Own Accuracy Treatment and Full Accuracy Treatment, similar to previous lab
experiments, shows that this phenomena is more robust than previously thought. However, the lack
of information aggregation in the Baseline shows that prices may not always aggregate information
well when the accuracy of information is not known. The results from the Baseline indicate that
policy makers who use prediction markets to make decisions should consider that these markets
may fail to aggregate information well.
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Deaves, R., Lüders, E., & Luo, G. Y. (2008). An Experimental Test of the Impact of Overconfidence and Gender on Trading Activity. Review of Finance, rfn023.
Deck, C., Lin, S., & Porter, D. (2013). Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets:
Experimental Evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 85, 48-62.
Dowie, J. 1976, On the Efficiency and Equity of Betting Markets, Economica 43, 139-150.
Eberlein, M., Ludwig, S., & Nafziger, J. (2011). The Effects Of Feedback On Self?Assessment.
Bulletin of Economic Research, 63(2), 177-199.
Estes, R., & Hosseini, J. (1988). The Gender Gap on Wall Street: an Empirical Analysis of
Confidence in Investment Decision Making. The Journal of Psychology, 122(6), 577-590.
Glaser, M., & Weber, M. (2007). Overconfidence and Trading Volume. The Geneva Risk and
Insurance Review, 32(1), 1-36.
Glaser, M., & Weber, M. (2009). Which Past Returns Affect Trading Volume?. Journal of Financial Markets, 12(1), 1-31.
Gervais, S., & Odean, T. (2001). Learning to Be Overconfident. Review of Financial Studies,
14(1), 1-27.
Grinblatt, M.,& Keloharju, M. (2009). Sensation Seeking, Overconfidence, and Trading Activity.
The Journal of Finance, 64(2), 549-578.
Hausch, D. B., William T. Z., and Mark R., 1981, Efficiency of the Market for Racetrack Betting.
Management Science 27, 1435-1452.
Hoch, S. J., & Loewenstein, G. F. (1989). Outcome Feedback: Hindsight and Information. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15(4), 605.
Hung, A. A., & Plott, C. R. (2001). Information Cascades: Replication and an Extension to
Majority Rule and Conformity-Rewarding Institutions. The American Economic Review, 91(5),
1508-1520.
Kelley, E. K., & Tetlock, P. C. (2013). Why Do Investors Trade?. Available at SSRN 2064144.
Keren, Gideon B., 1987, Facing Uncertainty in the Game of Bridge: A Calibration Study. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 98-114.
Kirchler, E., & Maciejovsky, B. (2002). Simultaneous Over-and Underconfidence: Evidence from
Experimental Asset Markets. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 25(1), 65-85.
Kyle, A. S., & Wang, F. A. (1997). Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?. The Journal of Finance, 52(5), 2073-2090.
93

Lenney, E. (1977). Women’s Self-confidence in Achievement Settings. Psychological Bulletin,
84(1), 1.
Lewellen, W. G., Lease, R. C., & Schlarbaum, G. G. (1977). Patterns of Investment Strategy and
Behavior among Individual Investors. The Journal of Business, 50(3), 296-333.
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Appendix
Sample Instructions - Full Accuracy Treatment

Welcome, and thank you for participating in this experiment.

Just for participating, you are guaranteed a $7.5 payment. You can earn additional money
based on your decisions, so it is important that you read the directions carefully. If you have any
questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to
you. Please do not talk or communicate with other participants over the duration of the experiment.
This study is composed of five parts. The first three parts consist of 10 periods each, in the
fourth part you will answer 7 short questions, and the last part is a short survey. You will be placed
in a group with four other people. The people in the group will be the same during the whole
experiment.
Part I
In the first part, each period you are shown 100 rectangles of various colors (red, yellow,
purple, black, green and blue), and your task is to count the number of red rectangles shown. You
have 7 seconds to finish this task, once time runs out you are asked to enter your best guess about
the number of red rectangles. Then you will be asked two follow-up questions.
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Question 1
Table 1: Question one Options
Options
Exact
Within 1
Within 2
Within 3
Within 4
Within 5
Within 6
Within 7
Within 8
Within 9
Guaranteed

Payoff
$33
$30
$27
$24
$21
$18
$15
$12
$9
$6
$3

The first question asks you how close your guess was to the true number of red rectangles.
Your payoff in that period will depend on the accuracy of your answer. You have several options
and the wider the interval you select, the less you are paid if you are correct.
If you state that your guess was the exact number of red rectangles and you were right, you
will get paid $33, but if you are wrong you will earn $0.
If you state that your guess was within +/- 1 and you are right, you are paid $30, but if you are
wrong you will be paid $0.
If you state that your guess was within +/- 2 and you are right, you are paid $27, but if you are
wrong you will be paid $0.
Each consecutive row has a wider interval and a lower payment. The next to last option is:
If you state that your guess was within +/- 9 and you are right, you are paid $6, but if you are
wrong you will be paid $0.
The last option is a guaranteed payment of $3 which you get regardless of how accurate your
guess is.
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Questions 2
The second question regards the other four people in your group. For this question you will
need to state how many of the other four people in your group were more accurate than you. More
accurate means they were closer to the true number of red rectangles than you were. You will
receive $2 if you answer this question correctly.
Example: if the true number of red rectangles is 48. You enter 44 and the other four people
enter 45, 47, 54, 58 then two people were more accurate than you since you are 4 away and the
other four are 3, 1, 6, and 10 away respectively. Thus there are two people who (3 away and 1
away) are closer than you.
After you answer these two questions, you will start with another counting task with a new
display of 100 rectangles and go through the same questions for a total of 10 periods.
Payment
If a period is chosen from Part I of the experiment for your payoff you will be paid for
both questions. That is, you will receive the payment from question one plus $2 if you answered
question two correctly.
Part II
Part two of the experiment is composed of 10 periods. In each period you will complete a
rectangle counting task as in Part I. You will only need to enter the number of red rectangles for
this part. Then you will participate in a trading session lasting 120 seconds where you can buy and
sell assets. At the beginning of each period, you and the four other people in your group are each
given a capital balance of 300 tokens and 3 assets. The value of the three assets is the same and it
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is either 100 or 0 tokens each. The value of the assets is the same for everyone in the group.
The value of the assets for your group will be determined randomly by the computer, with a 50%
chance all assets will have a value of 100 tokens and a 50% chance all assets will have a value of 0
tokens. Tokens are converted at the end of the experiment for dollars. You receive $1 for every 20
tokens you have after trading. This means that your assets are worth either $5 = 100 tokens/20
each or $0 = 0 tokens/20 each.
You do not know the true value of the assets during the trading session, but you will receive
some news about the value. The accuracy of the news depends on how close your guess was to the
true number of red rectangles that period. The more accurate your guess, the more accurate your
news is. The table below shows the different levels of accuracy for your news:
Difference Between Guess and

Accuracy of

True Number of Red Rectangles

the News

3 or less

95%

4, 5, 6

80%

7, 8, 9

65%

more than 9

50%

Accuracy means the chance that the news you receive is correct.
Example: If you are within six then the news you receive is correct 80% of the time. This
means that you will see the correct value of the assets 80 times out of 100 (80% of the time) and
the incorrect value of the assets 20 times out of 100 (20% of the time). So, if the value of the asset
picked by the computer is 100 then 80% of the time you would receive news that the value is 100,
and 20% of the time you would receive news that the value is 0. If instead the value of the asset
picked by the computer is 0 then 80% of the time you would receive the news that the value is 0
and 20% of the time you would receive the news that the value is 100.
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What does the accuracy of information mean?
Example 1
If you see a value of 100 tokens with 80% accuracy the expected value of each of the assets
you hold until the end of the trading is 80 = (100 ∗ 80%) + (0 ∗ 20%). So, if you hold your 3 assets
until the end of trading your expected value of the 3 assets is 240 tokens = 80 tokens ∗ 3 assets.
Example 2
If you see a value of 0 tokens with 95% accuracy the expected value of each of the assets you
hold until the end of the trading is 5 = (0 ∗ 95%) + (100 ∗ 5%). So, if you hold your 3 assets until
the end of trading your expected value of the 3 assets is 15 tokens = 5 tokens ∗ 3 assets.
The same accuracy rules applies for everyone in the group. The more accurate someone’s
guess of the number of red rectangles, the more likely it is that the news they receive is correct.
Notice that if your guess is 10 or more away from the true number of red rectangles then your
accuracy is 50% which means that the news is equally likely to be 0 and 100 regardless of what
the value of the assets is. In this case the news does not actually contain any information.
Please turn your attention to the screen in front of you where we will go over each part
of the trading platform.
For each asset you trade there is a fee of three tokens. So, if you sell three assets you pay a
fee of nine tokens or if you buy two assets you pay a fee of six tokens.
At the end of each period you will receive feedback on your performance in the trading task.
You will see:
1. The true value of the asset
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2. The value of the asset according to your news
3. The accuracy with which you saw the news
4. The number of assets you have
5. The number of tokens you have
6. The total value of your assets and tokens in dollars

How is the total value of assets and tokens converted to dollars?
Example: if at the end of the experiment you have two assets and 384 tokens and the asset
value for that period is 100 you will receive $29.20 = (384 tokens + 2 assets x 100 tokens)/20.
Once you receive this feedback you will start the next period with another counting task and go
through all these steps again. Tokens and assets cannot be carried from one period to the next. You
will start each period with 3 assets and 300 tokens.
Part III
You will complete 10 periods that are the same as the periods in Part I of the experiment.
Part IV In this part you will answer 7 short questions. You will receive $1 for each question
answered correctly. You will have 45 seconds to answer each question.
Part V
In part five you will complete a short survey.
Payoff for the experiment
Your payoff will be determined by your performance in one of the tasks you complete from
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Part I, II, or III. First, the computer randomly chooses one of the 30 periods you completed. If the
period chosen is from the first or the third part you will get paid for both questions you answered
on that part of the experiment. If the period chosen for your payoff is from the second part of the
experiment you will get paid based on your earnings from the trading task. The amount of money
you make in Part IV will be added to the random payoff chosen. Please raise your hand if you
have any questions and someone will approach you.
Script used for the Full Accuracy Treatment
You will see the news about the value of your assets on the top left of your screen. Below the
news you will be able to see the accuracy with which your news was generated.
Just below your signal is the number of tokens and assets you have. These numbers change
when you start buying and selling assets. Below this information you can see the trading platform.
The box in the middle allows you to enter the price and volume at which you want to sell or buy.
When you buy, the number of tokens you have is reduced by the number of tokens you spent
and the number of assets you buy is added to the assets you have. When you sell, the number of
assets you have is reduced by the number of assets you sell and the amount of tokens you have is
increased by the price multiplied by the number of assets you sell.
If you want to sell, you first enter the price and the number of assets you want to sell and then
click the button “Submit sell order.” If you want to buy you first enter the price and the number
of assets you want to buy then click the button “Submit buy order.” You can see your sell orders
above and on the right of the box where you enter the price and volume and your buy orders on the
box on the left. You can cancel an order at any time by selecting it and clicking cancel. You are
not allowed to buy or sell the orders you yourself have placed. Your buy or sell orders are shown
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in blue while the orders of others in your group are shown in black. You are not allowed to place
a sell order with more assets than you own or buy more assets than what you can afford with the
cash you have.
Example: if you have three assets that is the maximum number you can sell. On the other side
of the market, if you have 200 tokens you cannot buy three asset at 70 tokens each because this
would require 210 tokens. The computer shows a message each time you enter an invalid order.
On the box above and to the right of the price and volume box you will also see the orders
you can buy in addition to your order to sell. These orders will be ranked from the lowest price on
the top to the highest price on the bottom. If you want to enter a new order to sell the price must
be lower than the lowest price on the list. On the left above the price and volume box you will see
orders you can sell in addition to your order to buy. These orders will be ranked from the highest
on top of the list to the lowest on the bottom of the list. If you want to enter a new buy order your
price must be higher than the highest price on the list. To buy or sell you need to select (by clicking
on that row) the order which you are trying to buy or sell and then click either buy or sell.
Below the trading platform there is a table where you can see all of your previous actions.
You can choose what you see in this table by clicking on the buttons on the right. If you want to
see all orders you click on “All Orders” button, if you want to see only the orders you traded you
click on “Traded Orders” button, if you want to see your canceled orders you click on “Canceled
Orders”, and if you want to see the orders that were invalid you click on “Invalidated Orders.” You
only see your orders here not the orders of the other four people in your group.
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Screenshot for the Full Accuracy Treatment.
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Feedback Screenshot for the Full Accuracy Treatment.

CRT Questions and Survey
CRT Questions

1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost (in cents)?
2. It takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets. How many minutes would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets (enter a numeric value)?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
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for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake (enter a numeric value)?
4. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12
days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together?
5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many
students are in the class?
6. A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90.
How much has he made?
7. Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon,
from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon
has:
(a) broken even in the stock market
(b) is ahead of where he began
(c) has lost money

Survey

1. Gender
(a) Male
(b) Female
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2. Age
3. How much trading experience do you have?
(a) None
(b) Some
(c) Average
(d) More than average
(e) Professional
4. How many Math and Statistics classes have you taken?
5. On a scale 0-10 (with 0 being did not use it at all and 10 used it all the time) how much did
you use the accuracy of your news?
6. On a scale 0-10 (with 0 being did not find it useful at all and 10 very useful) how useful did
you find the accuracy of your news?
7. On a scale 0-10 (with 0 being did not use it at all and 10 used it all the time) how much did
you use the accuracy of the news of the other four group members?
8. On a scale 0-10 (with 0 being not useful at all and 10 very useful) how useful did you find
the accuracy of the news of the other four group members?
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Robustness Check Analysis
Gender Effect on Profits
Table 2: Gender Effects on Bayesian Net Profits

Variables

The dependent variable is the average net profit a participant earned in
Stage II. OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by group.
Own
Full
Own
Baseline
Accuracy
Accuracy
Baseline
Accuracy
Treatment Treatment
Treatment

Overestimation-1

-0.024
[0.146]

-0.251
[0.197]

-0.129
[0.127]

Overplacement-1
Male
Male ∗ Overestimation-1

1.019
[1.148]
-0.249
[0.224]

-0.359
[1.181]
0.153
[0.231]

-0.226
[0.643]
0.044
[0.170]

Male ∗ Overplacement-1
Group Controls
Constant

Yes
23.509***
[1.118]

Full
Accuracy
Treatment

Yes
23.700***
[1.394]

Yes
20.766***
[0.980]

0.036
[0.165]
2.367**
[0.883]

-0.073
[0.249]
-0.040
[0.957]

0.024
[0.061]
0.195
[0.732]

-0.555**
[0.242]
Yes
23.550***
[0.953]

-0.098
[0.314]
Yes
24.668***
[1.435]

0.007
[0.113]
Yes
20.432***
[1.133]

R-squared
0.076
0.052
0.141
0.085
0.051
0.138
Observations
300
300
300
300
300
300
Standard errors given in brackets. Two-tailed p-values: *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken. Trading
Experience is the reported trading experience by subjects on a scale of one to five with one being no
experience and five being professional trader. CRT is the number of correct CRT questions. Signal
Accuracy is how accurate the signal was for a given participant in that period (50%, 65%, 80% or 95%).

Robustness Check - Information Aggregation
Table 3: Summary statistics for each condition.
Baseline
Asset Value
Bayesian Expected
Value
Average Price
Closing Price

0
6.2 [17.3]

100
92.8 [19.6]

Own Accuracy
Treatment
0
100
5.3 [16.6] 92.5 [20.8]

49.7 [16.7]
46.7 [18.7]

50.5 [19.3]
49.3 [22.8]

41.9 [18.6]
35.7 [23.2]

Standard deviations in brackets.
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53.2 [18.0]
56.2 [23.7]

Full Accuracy
Treatment
0
100
8.5 [25.0]
96.2 [7.6]
36.0[19.8]
34.5[22.5]

60.0 [15.0]
63.5 [19.1]

Figure 1: Baeline

Figure 2: Own Accuracy Treatment
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Figure 3: Full Accuracy Treatment

Information Aggregation Using Closing Price
The dependent variable is the Bayesian Expected Value in a given period.
OLS regressions, standard errors clustered by group.

Variables

Closing Price

Own

Full

Accuracy

Accuracy

Treatment

Treatment

0.32

0.85**

1.17***

[0.35]

[0.26]

[0.12]

Baseline

Excess bids

Constant

R-squared

Own

Full

Accuracy

Accuracy

Treatment

Treatment

0.08

0.44

1.14***

[0.31]

[0.23]

[0.16]

2.77***

2.01*

0.35

[0.50]

[0.89]

[0.46]

Baseline

32.76*

9.64

-5.05

64.98***

45.24***

-2.63

[15.69]

[16.45]

[7.62]

[14.16]

[16.26]

[10.77]

0.020

0.211

0.391

0.150

0.297

0.394

Observations 60a
60
60
60
60
60
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
a. There are 10 observations for each group of five and for each condition there are six groups
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Chapter 3

The Effect of Overconfidence in the Insurance Purchasing Decisions

Abstract
Overconfidence has been found to have negative effects in an array of settings. This paper
focuses on the role overconfidence may play in insurance purchasing decisions. Overconfident
(underconfident) people underestimate (overestimate) the probability of loss and this may lead to
lower (higher) insurance coverage. The experiment presented in this paper explores how people
make decisions to buy actuarially fair insurance. Using a design similar to Camerer and Lovallo
(1999), I show that overconfident subjects purchase significantly less actuarially fair insurance
when the probability of loss is unknown and it depends on their own unknown ability than when
the probability of loss is known. These findings hold when one controls for risk preferences and
other demographic variables. This causal link between overconfidence and the decision to purchase
insurance may have important welfare implications. Sandroni and Squintani (2007) use a framework similar to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) and show that in the presence of overconfidence,
compulsory insurance does not improve all agents’ welfare because it makes low-risk agents worse
off.
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4.1

Introduction

Overconfidence is one of the most studied and established biases in the behavioral economics
literature. DeBondt and Thaler (1995) argue that: “perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.” Current research shows that overconfidence has
negative effects in an array of settings. Overconfidence has been found to lead to excess market
entry (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), increased volatility in financial markets (Barber and Odean,
1998; Barber and Odean, 2000; and Daniel et al., 2001), excessive investment in capital (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), and higher trading volume and lower returns (Odean, 1998; Biais et al.
2005; Glaser and Weber, 2007; Deaves et al., 2008; and Bregu (2017)).One area that has been
understudied is the role of overconfidence in the decision to purchase insurance. In this paper I
use an experiment to establish the causal link between overconfidence and insurance purchasing
decisions.
Overconfident (underconfident) people underestimate (overestimate) the probability of loss
and this may lead to lower (higher) insurance coverage. For example, if one is overconfident about
her health conditions she will underestimate the probability of getting sick and may underinsure.
The literature on the effects of overconfidence on insurance markets is thin and has not established
a clean causal relationship. Huang and Luo (2015) using survey data show that people who are
overconfident about their health are less likely to have health insurance. However, given the nature
of the data, Huang and Luo (2015) cannot establish a causal effect of overconfidence in the decision to purchase insurance. The current paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by providing
experimental evidence of the effects of overconfidence in insurance purchasing decisions.
In this experiment subjects make decisions about how much insurance to purchase in order to
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cover their accumulated earnings from previous tasks. Subjects make a decision to purchase insurance when they know the probability of loss depends on their unknown ability, which is referred
to as the Unknown Probability Treatment. Subjects know the probability of loss in the other two
treatments. In one of them the probability of loss is the same as in the Unknown Probability Treatment and this treatment is referred to as the Known Probability Treatment.1 To check that subjects
are making rational decisions another treatment was added. In this third treatment the probability
of loss could be 20 percentage points higher or 20 percentage points lower than in the Known Probability Treatment. This treatment is referred to as the Known Probability Check Treatment. The
insurance cost was the same for all treatments and it was the actuarially fair price for the Unknown
Probability Treatment and the Known Probability Treatment. Hence, the only difference between
the Unknown Probability Treatment and the Known Probability Treatment is that subjects have to
estimate the probability of loss in the Unknown Probability Treatment but know the probability of
loss in the Known Probability Treatment.
This design is similar to Camerer and Lovallo (1999) who explore market entry by varying
how ranking, which determines payoffs, was determined. In one of their treatments ranking was
based on ability and in the other it was assigned randomly. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) find that
significantly more people enter the market when ranking depends on ability. In the current experiment overconfidence is exogenously manipulated to capture the causal effects overconfidence
may have on insurance purchasing decisions. To achieve this the probability of loss is tied to
the performance in a trivia task for the Unknown Probability Treatment which allows one to be
overconfident. The probability of loss is equal to the proportion of incorrect responses a subject
provides, hence if one overestimates her performance she will underestimate the probability of
1

Subjects were not told how this probability was calculated.
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loss. To eliminate the possibility for one to underestimate the probability of loss subjects are provided the probability of loss in the Known Probability Treatment. Bregu (2017) shows that when
subjects are provided with their exact performance overconfidence no longer plays a role in an asset market experiment. If the manipulation of overconfidence here is successful one would expect
overconfident (underconfident) subjects to buy less (more) insurance in the Unknown Probability
Treatment than in the Known Probability treatment.
There are two main problems that arise when one is looking to establish a causal relationship
between overconfidence and the decision to purchase insurance. First, overconfidence is not observed in the market and one has to resort to proxy measures to capture it. For example, Huang and
Luo (2015) use an estimate about height shrinkage to calculate a measure of overconfidence about
health conditions. Using a survey that asks participants to report their current height and their
height 25 years ago the authors calculate perceived height shrinkage. Using the current height,
measured by nurses, and the estimated biological pre-shrinkage height (the estimated height 25
years ago) the authors determine the actual height shrinkage.2 Since height shrinkage is related
to health conditions the authors argue that those who report lower height shrinkage than the actual height shrinkage are overconfident about their health conditions. However, this measure may
suffer from possible confounds that do not allow one to capture the true level of overconfidence.
For instance, people may report lower height shrinkage because they want to feel good about their
health conditions.
The second problem one faces when studying the effect of overconfidence in insurance markets is that one has to control for risk preferences. This is important because risk preferences are
2

The estimated biological pre-shrinkage height was done based on the same methodology used
in Huang et al. (2013).
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very closely related to insurance markets but also because overconfidence may have an opposite
effect to risk in insurance markets. If overconfidence affects insurance markets then the more overconfident one is, the lower will be the willingness to purchase insurance while the more risk averse
one is the higher the willingness to purchase insurance will be. The literature to date regarding
the relationship between risk preferences and overconfidence is limited. Hardies et al. (2013) find
that there is no statistically significant relationship between overconfidence and risk preferences.
in Chapter 1 I find similar results with Hardies et al. (2013). In the current paper in addition to
overconfidence I elicit risk preferences as well to address this issue.
The findings of the current paper may have important welfare implications. Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) using a simple model with high and risk agents show that compulsory insurance
can be beneficial to both high and low risk agents. More recently Sandroni and Squintani (2007)
using the same framework as Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have argued that when there is a significant fraction of overconfident (underconfident) agents, compulsory insurance does not improve
all agents’ welfare because it makes low-risk agents worse off. Sandroni and Squintani (2007)
argue that overconfident (underconfident) people behave as low (high) risk people and underinsure
(overinsure). The findings from the current paper show that overconfident (underconfident) people
purchase less (more) insurance which supports the main assumption of Sandroni and Squintani
(2007) that there exists a causal link between overconfidence and the decision making in insurance
settings.
The experiment presented in this paper was also designed to explore the stability of different
overconfidence measures and the relationship between risk preferences and overconfidence. To
date there is no agreement among researchers on what is the best way to elicit overconfidence.
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Researchers have used different methods but it is not clear if these methods elicit the same beliefs.
In this paper overconfidence is elicited using two different tasks and the results are compared. The
data shows that these two different measures are not statistically significantly correlated. Important
implications for existing and future research are also discussed in the paper. In addition, there is
no evidence that risk preferences are correlated with overconfidence based on the measures of risk
and overconfidence elicited in this paper.

4.2

Experimental Design

The study is composed of two main parts: Part I. Overconfidence and Risk Elicitation and
Part II. Insurance Purchase Decision. In Part I subjects completed two overconfidence tasks and
one risk elicitation task. In Part II subjects were given the opportunity to purchase insurance.
For this part a within subject design with three treatments is implemented to establish a causal link
between overconfidence and insurance purchasing decisions. The experimental design is organized
as follows. The first subsection discusses the overconfidence and risk elicitation tasks, the second
subsection discusses the insurance market, and the last subsection describes the summary of the
procedures followed in the experiment.

4.2.1

Overconfidence and Risk Elicitation

Overconfidence Task I
Participants’ overconfidence is elicited using two different tasks. The first task is that of
Bregu (2017). Subjects complete one practice period and ten paid periods for this task. Since
this experiment does not involve interactions of players only a measure of overestimation, which
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measures how overconfident one is with regard to her own ability, was elicited using this task.
A matrix of 100 rectangles with six different colors (black, green, blue, purple, yellow and red)
is used to elicit a measure of overestimation. A participant is given seven seconds to count the
number of red rectangles.3 After subjects enter the number of red rectangles they were asked to
report who close they were to the true number of red rectangles. Subjects had several options,
shown in Table 1, from which they could choose. A subject could overestimate, underestimate or
be well calibrated in a given round. One would be considered to have overestimated if she states
that she is closer to the true number of red rectangles than she actually is. If the opposite occurs,
one states that she is further away from the true number of red rectangles than what she actually
is, one would be considered to have underestimated. Lastly, if one correctly predicts the distance
from the true number of red rectangles then she would be considered well calibrated. To calculate a
measure of overestimation the number of rounds one underestimates is subtracted from the number
of the rounds she overestimated. Since one can overestimate all ten rounds or underestimate all
ten rounds this measure ranges from negative ten to positive ten with zero being well calibrated.
Lastly, participants are not provided with feedback so they cannot learn about their performance
during this part of the experiment.
3

The seven seconds is determined by Bregu (2017) based on a pilot. The goal was to create
uncertainty on the part of participants. Seven seconds was found not to provide enough time for
the participants to count every red rectangle, but was enough time to form an educated guess.
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Table 1: Options and Payoffs
Options

Payoff

Exact

$33

Within 1

$30

Within 2

$27

Within 3

$24

Within 4

$21

Within 5

$18

Within 6

$15

Within 7

$12

Within 8

$9

Within 9

$6

Guaranteed

$3

Overconfidence Task II
The second task used to elicit overconfidence is taken from Moore and Healy (2008). For
this task subjects answered ten trivia questions selected from the trivia questions used in Moore
and Healy (2008) with some modification (see the Appendix).4 For each correct answer subjects
received $1 payoff and received $0 for each incorrect answer. After subjects answered all ten
questions they were asked to state the probability that each of the 11 (zero correct to ten correct)
possible scores, they could have received, was correct. Participants were paid based on the following formula: 1 + r - w where r = 2p (p is the probability assigned to the actual number of correct
answers) and w is the sum total of the squared probabilities assigned to each of the 11 possible
scores (w =

Pi=10
i=0

p2i ). This task is used to create a measure of overestimation. To calculate the

overestimation measure for this task first the predicted expected score by a subject is calculated
based on the probabilities allocated to each of the 11 possible scores. The actual score is then sub4

The question “What citys NFL team is known as the Cowboys” was changed to “What citys
NFL team is known as the Vikings” because the University of Arkansas is close to Dallas and the
vast majority of students would know the answer with high certainty.
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tracted from the predicted score. If this difference is positive it means that a subject overestimated
her performance, if this value is equal to zero the subject was well calibrated, and if the number is
negative the subject underestimated her performance.
Risk Elicitation Task
In this part subjects were allocated $25 and were asked to choose one of the six lotteries
shown below similar to Eckel and Grossman (2002). Subjects were told that the payoff from the
chosen lottery would be determined by flipping a coin. These lotteries were chosen in such a way
that subjects could be classified in six different risk preference bins. Lotteries one through four
separate subjects in four different levels of risk aversion. A risk neutral person would prefer lottery
five as it has the highest expected payoff and a sufficiently risk loving person should always choose
lottery six.5 It should be noted that subjects completed the three tasks in Part I in a random order.
Table 2: Lotteries
Lottery
1
2
3
4
5
6

5

Event
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail

Probability of the event
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%

Payoff
-$16.00
-$16.00
-$18.10
-$13.50
-$19.00
-$12.20
-$20.00
-$10.75
-$22.00
-$8.10
-$23.00
-$7.25

These estimations were made using the following CRRA utility function: U (x) =
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x1−r
.
1−r

4.2.2

Insurance Purchase Decision

Once subjects completed Part I they were asked to make three insurance purchasing decisions
one for each of the following: Unknown Probability Treatment, Known Probability Treatment, and
Known Probability Check Treatment. Subjects were shown their total earnings at the beginning of
Part II. To calculate total earnings a number randomly generated from a Poisson distribution (see
the Appendix) was added to the earnings from the first three tasks. This procedure was done to
ensure that the subjects could not infer how well they had done on the trivia task. The Poisson
distribution was shown to subjects and the instructions explained how their total earnings were
calculated. Subjects at this point were told that they could lose all of their earnings (except the
show-up fee) in this part, but they had the opportunity to purchase insurance to protect against
the possibility of a loss. Subjects could purchase any amount of insurance they want up to full
coverage.
To ensure that the decisions of subjects were not due to a lack of understanding of probability,
subjects were presented with a table which showed their payoffs if they insured in increments of
ten percent of their earnings. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of how this was done for the Unknown
Probability Treatment. For the other two treatments p was replaced with the exact probability of
loss. In addition to this, once subjects made a decision they were given feedback about what their
payoffs could be based on their actual decision. For example, if they insured 70 percent of their
earnings they saw the information in that column only. At this point subjects were given the chance
to change this decision once or continue and submit this decision. If subjects chose to change their
decision they returned to the previous screen and then made a decision that was final.

119

Figure 1: Insurance Decision Table

In the Unknown Probability Treatment subjects were told that the probability of loss depended
on their performance on the trivia questions task.6 The probability of loss was determined by
dividing the number of incorrectly answered trivia questions by ten. For instance, if a subject
missed four questions the probability of loss would be 40%. The probability of loss from the
trivia task is used to determine the price of the insurance for all treatments. The price of insurance
is the actuarially fair price for the Unknown Probability Treatment and the Known Probability
Treatment since for these treatments the probability of loss is the same. In the example given above
the price of one unit of insurance would be $0.40. In the Known Probability Treatment subjects
knew the probability of loss before making a decision.7 Hence, the decision of a well calibrated
individual in these two treatments should be the same since the probability of loss is the same.8
On the other hand, if a subject is overconfident (underconfident) she will predict that she missed
fewer (more) questions than the actual number of missed questions and as a consequence she will
underestimate (overestimate) the probability of loss in the Unknown Probability Treatment. This
underestimation (overestimation) of the probability of loss may cause lower (higher) coverage
of insurance in the Unknown Probability Treatment since the insurance will appear more (less)
6

The trivia task was chosen to determine the probability of loss because it was easier to explain
to subjects how the probability of loss is calculated.
7
Subjects were not told how this probability was determined, they were only told what the
probability of loss was for this treatment.
8
An individual is considered well calibrated if she correctly predicts the probability of loss in
the Unknown Probability Treatment.
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expensive to the subjects than what it actually is.
The last treatment, the Known Probability Check Treatment, was designed to hide the fact that
in the Known Probability Treatment subjects were shown their true probability of loss and to check
if subjects were making rational decisions. To achieve this subjects in this treatment were given a
probability of loss 20 percentage points greater or 20 percentage points lower than the probability
of loss in the other two treatments while the price of insurance remained the same. Given the
change of probability subjects should change their decisions accordingly. For instance, a subjects
would be expected to purchase the same amount of insurance or more if the probability of loss is
highest in this treatment. If the probability of loss in this treatment is less than the probability of
loss in the other two treatments subjects should purchase the same amount of insurance or less than
in the first two conditions. The order of these three treatments was randomly determined for each
subject to account for any order effects on subjects’ decisions.

4.2.3

Procedures

The experiment was coded using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the Behavioral
Business Research Lab (BBRL) at the University of Arkansas. Participants were informed in
the instructions that they would be paid based on their performance and that their show-up fee
was guaranteed. Subjects were told that their earnings from Part I, including the added random
payment, could be lost in Part II of the experiment. The final earnings were determined based on
the earnings in one of the three treatments of Part II, which was randomly determined.
A total of 128 participants were recruited for the 60-minute study.9 Subjects were provided
9

The analysis is based on 123 subjects since four subjects answered either zero correct questions (100% probability of loss) or 10 correct (0% probability of loss) questions and the data from
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with computerized instructions for each part of the experiment. Subjects always started with Part I,
then moved on to Part II. At the end of the experiment they completed a survey. Subjects were not
shown their realized payoffs for any of the three tasks in Part I. This was done so subjects would
not be able to know with certainty the performance on the trivia questions. At the beginning of Part
II subjects were shown their total earnings and were given instructions about the insurance market.
Then subjects made a decision about how much insurance they wanted to purchase in each of the
three treatments. Regardless of the order, of the treatments in Part II, subjects did not receive any
feedback about the final outcome on the previous decision(s). That is to say, subjects do not learn if
they lost their earnings or not in any case until the study was completed. Once subjects finished Part
II, they answered some survey questions which included: demographic questions, CRT questions
developed by Toplak et al. (2014), Optimism Bias questions taken from Scheier (1994), a risk
question taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) and some probability questions
(see the Appendix).10

4.3

Results

4.3.1

Summary Statistics

The data consists of the choices of 123 subjects. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the
demographic variables, the two overconfidence measures and the risk measure. The variable Math
& Stat Classes is the reported number of math and statistics classes a student has taken after high
school. Degree ranges from one which is High School Diploma or GED to five being a Doctorate
a fifth subjects was incomplete due to a coding error.
10
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a longitudinal survey of private households
conducted by the German Institute for Economic Research.
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Degree (see the Appendix for more details). CRT is the number of correct CRT questions out of
a total of seven questions. Optimism Score is a variable calculated based on six Optimism Bias
questions (Scheier, 1994). The score ranges from six (least optimistic) to 30 (most optimistic). The
variable Correct Trivia is the number of correct trivia questions out of a total of ten questions. The
variable Overestimation is the variable calculated based on overconfidence task one. This measure
ranges from negative ten to positive ten, with zero being well calibrated. A positive number indicates overconfidence and a negative number indicates underconfidence. The next variable is the
Trivia Overestimation which is the second overconfidence measure calculated based on predicted
number of correct trivia questions minus the actual number of correct trivia questions. A positive
number for this measure indicates overconfidence, a negative number indicates underconfidence
and a subject is well calibrated if he has a measure of zero. It should be noted that neither of these
two overconfidence measures are statistically different from zero on average. Risk is a measure
of risk preferences elicited using the Eckel and Grossman (2002) style technique where a value of
one is the most risk averse and a value of six is the most risk loving. Hence, an average of 2.46
indicates that the average subject was risk averse. Lastly, Survey Risk is the risk measure based on
the risk question taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
Figures 2 and 3 provide more details on the overconfidence measures. Based on the counting task, 58 subjects underestimated their performance, 61 overestimated their performance and 4
were well calibrated. Similar results are found for the overestimation measure calculated based on
the expected and the actual performance on the trivia questions. An equal number of 59 subjects
overestimated and underestimated their performance and the remaining 5 subjects were well calibrated. Figure 4 shows the distribution of risk preferences based on six 50/50 lotteries. Recall that
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Men

48.78%

Age

22.38

4.17

Math & Stat Classes

2.93

2.08

Degree

2.28

0.80

CRT

1.46

1.63

Optimism Score

21.31

3.66

Correct Trivia

4.31

1.88

Overestimation

0.75

5.11

Trivia Overestimation

0.20

1.51

Risk

2.46

1.60

Survey Risk

5.92

1.88

lotteries one through four capture different levels of risk aversion, lottery five captures risk neutral
preferences and lottery six captures risk loving preferences. The distribution of risk preferences in
Figure 4 shows that the vast majority of the subjects, 110 subjects, were risk averse, three subjects
were risk neutral and the remaining ten subjects were risk loving. Figure 5 shows the distribution
of the Risk Survey measure based on the survey question. The question asks subjects to report how
risky they think they are on a scale of zero to ten. The average reported risk attitude based on this
measure is approximately six.
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Figure 2: Overestimation Based on the Counting Task

Figure 3: Overestimation Based on the Trivia Task
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Figure 4: Risk Preference Distribution

Figure 5: Risk Distribution: Based on the Survey Question

4.3.2

Overconfidence and Risk

This section explores the relationship between the two overconfidence measures, the relationship
between the two risk measures and the relationships among the overconfidence measures and the
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risk measures. The main purpose of including two measures of overconfidence in this experiment
was to explore if different tasks elicit the same beliefs with regard to overconfidence. Figure 6
presents the scatter plot of the two measures of overconfidence. As is apparent from the fitted line
the two measures are at best only slightly positively correlated. The correlation coefficient for the
two overconfidence measures is 0.032 which is not statistically different from zero at the five
percent level (p-value = 0.7199). This shows that different tasks elicit different beliefs with regard
to overconfidence. Important implications of this finding are discussed in the last section of this
paper. Before looking at the correlation of overconfidence measures with the risk measures the
correlation of the two risk measures is explored. Figure 7 presents a scatter plot of the two risk
measures. The scatter plot shows that the two measures are positively correlated. This correlation
is statistically significantly different from zero at the one percent level (the correlation coefficient
is 0.312 and the p-value = 0.0003).
The literature to date on the relationship between overconfidence and risk is thin. There is some
evidence that risk and overconfidence are not correlated as shown in Hardies et al. (2013) and
Chapter 1. The current design allows one to explore this issue further and provide more
experimental evidence of the correlation between overconfidence and risk preferences. Table 4
presents the correlation between each overconfidence measure and the risk measures. As can be
seen there is no statistically significant correlation between either of the overconfidence measures
with either of the risk measures. To explore the relationship in more detail a set of regressions is
conducted for each overconfidence measure with and without controls (see the Appendix). These
results show that even after one controls for other factors that may affect overconfidence neither
of the overconfidence measures is correlated with the two risk measures. Hence these results are
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in line with the previous findings in Hardies et al. (2013) and the findings in Chapter 1.
Figure 6: Correlation Between Overconfidence Measures

Figure 7: Correlation Between Risk Measures

128

Table 4: Correlation of Risk and Overconfidence
Measures

Risk

Survey Risk

Overestimation

Trivia Overestimation

0.118

0.084

[0.185]

[0.346]

0.124

0.102

[0.163]

[0.252]

P-values are given in brackets.

4.3.3

Insurance Decisions Results

Figure 8 shows the percent of earnings insured by overconfident and underconfident subjects in
the Unknown Probability Treatment and the Known Probability Treatment. If one’s confidence
about her ability does not matter then one would expect to find no difference between
overconfident and underconfident subjects in the Unknown Probability Treatment. Yet, the results
from a t-test reveal that overconfident subjects purchase significantly less insurance than
underconfident subjects based on a one-tailed t-test (p-value = 0.0249).11 This is not the case for
the Known Probability Treatment (one-tailed p-value = 0.1932). This indicates that one’s
confidence about the probability of loss affects how much insurance is purchased. The result
becomes even more stark when one looks at only those subjects who overestimated or
underestimated the probability of loss by at least seven and a half percentage points.12 Figure 9
11

A one-tailed t-test is used here since the hypothesis being tested states that overconfident
people purchase less insurance than underconfident people.
12
Given that the probability of loss must be in ten percentage point increments, if one overestimates (underestimates) the probability of loss by less than five percentage points then this prediction would round to the correct probability of loss. In the data there is a difference in behavior
between subjects who overestimate or underestimate by no more than five percentage points and
those who overestimate or underestimate by more than five percentage points. Seven and a half
percentage points was chosen as a representative cutoff for those who are not well calibrated.
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shows the insurance decisions for subjects who overestimated or underestimated the probability
of loss by at least seven and a half percentage points. Subjects who overestimated the probability
of loss by seven and a half percentage points purchase about 19 percent less insurance than
subjects who underestimated the probability of loss by seven and a half percent and this
difference is statistically significant based on a one-tailed t-test (p-value = 0.0020). The difference
in the percent of earnings insured for those who overestimate and those who underestimate the
probability of loss by at least seven and a half percentage points for the Known Probability
Treatment is about seven percent, but this difference is not statistically significant (one-tailed
p-value = 0.1342).
The main goal of the paper is to explore if there exists a causal relationship between
overconfidence and the decision to purchase insurance. An overconfident (underconfident) subject
underestimates (overestimates) her probability of loss and as consequence purchases less (more)
insurance. Yet, one would expect that when the probability of loss is provided subjects adjust
their decision accordingly. Hence, one would expect overconfident (underconfident) subjects to
purchase more (less) insurance in the Known Probability Treatment than in the Unknown
Probability Treatment. As it can be seen from Figure 8 overconfident subjects purchase the same
amount of insurance in both treatments and this is confirmed by a one-tailed t-test (p-value =
0.4698).13 Underconfident subjects on the other hand move in the expected direction and
purchase statistically significantly less insurance at the ten percent level (one-tailed p-value =
0.0713). Figure 9 shows only subjects who overestimated or underestimated by at least seven and
a half percentage points. In this figure both overconfident and underconfident subjects move in
13

A one-tailed t-test is used here since the hypotheses being tested states that overconfident
(underconfident) people should insure more (less) in the Known Probability Treatment than in the
Unknown Probability Treatment.
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Figure 8: Overconfidence and Insurance
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Figure 9: Overconfidence and Insurance
For those who overestimate or underestimate the probability of
loss by at least seven and a half percentage points.
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the expected directions in the amount insured when comparing the Unknown Probability
Treatment with the Known Probability Treatment. Overconfident subjects purchase about five
percent more and underconfident subjects purchase about six percent less insurance in the Known
Probability Treatment. A one-tailed t-test reveals that the difference of overconfident people
between treatments is statistically different at the ten percent level (p-value = 0.0817). The same
test shows that the difference for the underconfident people is not statistically different at the ten
percent level (one-tailed p-value = 0.1369). The lack of significance for the underconfident people
may be due to the small sample size. Hence, these analysis provides some evidence that there
exists a causal link between overconfidence and insurance buying decisions.
Insurance purchasing decisions are affected by many factors with the most discussed factor in the
literature being risk preferences. In the analysis so far there is no control for risk preferences
which may explain the weak evidence of the effect of overconfidence on one’s insurance
purchasing decisions. To explore the data in more detail a set of regression models is presented in
Table 5. The dependent variable for these regressions is the percentage of earnings insured by a
subject for the first four columns and for the last two columns the dependent variable is the
difference on the amount insured between the Unknown Probability Treatment and the Known
Probability Treatment. The regression results show that overconfidence is significantly negatively
correlated with the amount insured for the Unknown Probability Treatment but not for the Known
Probability Treatment. These results remain the same when one controls for risk, Optimism Bias,
demographic variables, Probability Score, the order in which the treatment was completed and the
probability of loss. Yet, in order to provide a causal link one would have to show that
overconfidence, as measured by overestimation, is significantly correlated with the difference
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between the amount insured in the Unknown Probability Treatment and the Known Probability
Treatment. The dependent variable for the last two columns of Table 5 is the percentage of insured
earnings in the Unknown Probability Treatment minus the percentage of insured earnings in the
Known Probability Treatment. Hence, one would expect the coefficient to be negative because the
insured earnings are expected to be higher in the Known Probability Treatment than in the
Unknown Probability Treatment. The two-tailed p-value for the Trivia Overestimation is 0.1260
for the model without controls (column five) and 0.0990 for the model with controls (column 6).
This means that Trivia Overestimation has a statistically significant effect on the difference
between two treatments on the amount insured since the appropriate test here is one-tailed in
which case the p-values would be 0.0630 and 0.0445.
To show further support of the causal relationship between overconfidence and the insurance
purchasing decisions a new set of regressions is presented in Table 6. In this table the dependent
variable is the percentage of total earnings insured. The Unknown Probability Treatment (UPT)
variable is one for the Unknown Probability Treatment and zero for the Known Probability
Treatment and the Trivia Overestimation Dummy (TOD) is one if Trivia Overestimation is greater
than zero (greater than or equal to 0.75 for column three and four). If overconfidence affects the
insurance making decisions differently in the Unknown Probability Treatment one would expect
the interaction term (UPT ∗ TOD) to be negative and statistically significant. The regression
results presented in the first two columns in Table 6 shows that this is not the case when one looks
at all the data (one-tailed p-value = 0.1235 for column one and p-value = 0.1800 for column two).
However, when one looks at those who overestimated or underestimated by at least seven and a
half percentage points the interaction term becomes significant at the five percent level (one-tailed
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Table 5: Overconfidence and Insurance
The dependent variable is the percentage of total earnings insured.

Trivia Overestimation

Unknown

Known

Difference Between

Probability Treatment

Probability Treatment

Treatments

-0.047***

-0.046***

-0.024*

-0.280*

-0.023

-0.026*

[0.015]

[0.017]

[0.014]

[0.016]

[0.015]

[0.016]

Risk
Men
Age
Math & Stat Classes
Degree
CRT
Optimism Score
Probability Score
Treatment Order

-0.017

-0.022

0.007

[0.019]

[0.019]

[0.014]

-0.084

-0.044

-0.035

[0.052]

[0.056]

[0.049]

0.009

0.001

0.007

[0.009]

[0.008]

[0.007]

0.021

-0.005

0.025

[0.012]

[0.012]

[0.016]

-0.099**

-0.066

-0.039

[0.044]

[0.051]

[0.038]

-0.003

0.008

-0.006

[0.021]

[0.022]

[0.020]

-0.006

-0.004

-.004

[0.007]

[0.006]

[0.005]

0.055

0.016

0.045

[0.037]

[0.035]

[0.034]

0.021

0.009

[0.032]

[0.035]

Probabiltiy of Loss
Constant
R-squared

0.001

0.001

[0.001]

[0.002]

0.506***

0.575**

0.469***

0.680**

0.037

-0.145

[0.026]

[0.249]

[0.026]

[0.215]

[0.026]

[0.209]

0.065

0.167

0.016

0.058

0.016

0.078

Observations
123
123
123
123
123
123
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken.
Degree is a variable that goes from one for High School Diploma or GED and CRT to five for a
Doctorate Degree. CRT is the number of correct CRT questions. Optimism Score is based on the
answers to the six questions taken from Scheier (1994). Probability Score is the number of correct
probability qustions. Treatment Order is the order in which the decision was made for that treatment.
Probability of Loss is the probability of loss the subject faced when making a decision.
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p-value = 0.0435 for column three and one-tailed p-value = 0.0470).14 This shows further support
of the causal link between overconfidence and the decision to purchase insurance.
Interestingly the regression results in Table 5 show no significant correlation between risk and
how much insurance subjects purchase. To explore this issue further, the data from a survey
question with regard to risk taken from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
(see Table 2 in the Appendix) is used. Using this different measure of risk does not change the
main results shown in Table 5, but now the coefficient for risk is negative and statistically
significant at the five percent level for both treatments. This shows that the risk measure used in
the survey is a better predictor of how much insurance one purchases. This indicates that using
the survey question may be a better way of eliciting risk preferences. Yet, one has to consider that
the survey question was completed after the decisions for insurance were made, so it is possible
that subjects who insured less reported that they were more willing to take risks in general. It
should be noted that the two risk measures are correlated with the correlation coefficient 0.29
which is statistically significant at the five percent level. Previous research has also found a
significant correlation between measures of risk that are incentivized and elicited through the
survey question used here (Dohmen et al., 2011).
The Known Probability Check Treatment was designed to verify if subjects were making rational
decisions. Recall that in this treatment subjects had a probability of loss that differed by 20 (plus
or minus) percentage points from the probability of loss in the Known Probability Treatment. If
subjects act rationally then one would expect them to insure more (less) of their earnings in the
Known Probability Check Treatment than in the Known Probability Treatment when the
14

The results remain significant (at the ten percent level) when a continuous variable is used
instead of the Trivia Overestimation Dummy.
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Table 6: Treatment Effects of Overconfidence on Insurance Purchasing Decisions
The dependent variable is the percentage of total earnings insured.
All
Overestimate or Underestimate
Data
by 0.75 Questions or More
Unknown Probability Treatment (UPT)
0.058
0.047
0.061
0.059
[0.039]
[0.040]
[0.054]
[0.0754]
Trivia Overestimation Dummy (TOD)
-0.047
-0.068
-0.074
-0.095
[0.054]
[0.056]
[0.068]
[0.072]
UPT ∗ TOD
-0.060
-0.050
-0.114*
-0.113*
[0.052]
[0.054]
[0.066]
[0.067]
Risk
-0.021
-0.016
[0.017]
[0.021]
Men
-0.091
-0.008
[0.047]
[0.060]
Age
0.006
0.005
[0.008]
[0.013]
Math & Stat Classes
0.007
0.003
[0.010]
[0.013]
Degree
-0.078
-0.088
[0.049]
[0.068]
CRT
-0.003
0.010
[0.021]
[0.025]
Optimism Score
-0.005
-0.009
[0.007]
[0.006]
Probability Score
0.033
0.032
[0.032]
[0.039]
Treatment Order
0.028
0.013
[0.019]
[0.025]
Probabiltiy of Loss
0.001
0.000
[0.001]
[0.001]
Constant
0.493*** 0.572** 0.491***
0.721**
[0.036]
[0.204]
[0.048]
[0.237]
R-squared
0.022
0.094
0.065
0.124
Observations
236
236
140
140
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Unknown Probability Treatment is one for the Unknown Probability Treatment and zero for the
Known Probability Treatment. Trivia Overestimation Dummy is a dummy that is one if Trivia
Overestimation is greater than zero and zero if Trivia Overestimation is less than zero. Treatment∗
TOD is the interaction term of Treatment and the Trivia Overestimation Dummy. Math & Stat Classes
is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken. Degree is a variable that goes from
one for High School Diploma or GED and CRT to five for a Doctorate Degree. CRT is the number of
correct CRT questions. Optimism Score is based on the answers to the six questions taken from
Scheier (1994). Probability Score is the number of correct probability qustions. Treatment Order
of correct probability qustions. Treatment Order is the order in which the decision was made for that
treatment. Probability of Loss is the probability of loss the subject faced when making a decision.
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probability of loss increases (decreases) by 20 percentage points. Figure 10 presents the
difference between the amount insured in the in the Known Probability Check Treatment and the
Known Probability Treatment when the probability increased or decreased by 20 percentage
points. While subjects seem to move in the right direction a t-test reveals only the change of
subjects who received an increase of 20 percentage points is statistically different from zero. The
p-value is equal to 0.012 for the 20 percentage point increase in probability of loss and p-value is
equal to 0.4321 for the 20 percentage point decrease in the probability of loss. However, there is a
statistically significant difference between the two changes based on the t-test (p-value = 0.0036).
This provides some evidence that subjects responded to the change in probability in the expected
direction.
Figure 10: Known Probability Treatment vs. Known Probability Check Treatment
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4.4

Discussion

In this paper I present experimental evidence of the effects of overconfidence on the insurance
purchasing decisions. Subjects made decisions on how much insurance they wanted to purchase
to protect their earnings against a potential loss. By varying the information subjects had about
the probability of loss, but holding the actual probability fixed, I show that subjects who are more
overconfident purchase less insurance. This is an important finding given the implications of
Sandroni and Squintani (2007) who show that the findings of Rothchild and Stiglitz (1976) no
longer hold if there is a significant fraction of overconfident and underconfident individuals. The
results in this paper are robust to other factors that may affect insurance purchasing decision such
as risk preferences and other demographic factors. To the best of my knowledge this is the first
paper to show a causal link between overconfidence and the decision to purchase insurance.
These results are in line with the findings of Huang and Luo (2015) who found that
overconfidence about height shrinkage was correlated with the decision to purchase insurance.
The results in the current paper may have implications for other markets as well. For example,
there is some evidence that drivers are overconfident about their driving ability (Svenson, 1981).
Further research should concentrate on exploring how overconfidence in specific markets may
affect insurance decision making.
In addition, this paper explores the stability of overconfidence when one uses different elicitation
tasks. The two measures of overconfidence in this paper are not significantly correlated with each
other. While more research is needed to better understand the stability of overconfidence there are
some implications that need to be discussed based on this finding. First, given that overconfidence
may vary with the task implemented researchers should design experiments that directly connect
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the overconfidence task with the variable of interest. Second, when this is not possible the results
of overconfidence have to be carefully interpreted. For instance, in this paper the overconfidence
task from the trivia questions determines the probability of loss so one can generalize these
results. On the other hand, in cases such as the results in Bregu et al. (2017) one cannot
generalize the results. In Bregu et al. (2017) find that overconfidence is not affected by alcohol,
but given the findings in the current paper this should be interpreted as no effect of alcohol on this
specific type of overconfidence. Lastly, future research should explore what is the best way to
elicit overconfidence.
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Appendix
Sample Instructions
Welcome, and thank you for participating in this experiment.
Just for participating, you are guaranteed a $5 payment. You can earn additional money
based on your decisions, so it is important that you read the directions carefully. If you have any
questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to come to
you. Please do not talk or communicate with other participants for the duration of the experiment.
This study is composed of five parts. Below you can find the information for each of these
parts.
Part I
In the first part, each period you are shown 100 rectangles of various colors (red, yellow,
purple, black, green and blue), and your task is to count the number of red rectangles shown. You
have 7 seconds to finish this task, once time runs out you are asked to enter your best guess about
the number of red rectangles. Then you will be asked a follow-up question.
Table 1: Question one Options
Options
Exact
Within 1
Within 2
Within 3
Within 4
Within 5
Within 6
Within 7
Within 8
Within 9
Guaranteed

Payoff
$33
$30
$27
$24
$21
$18
$15
$12
$9
$6
$3
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The question asks you to state how close your guess was to the true number of red rectangles.
Your payoff in that period will depend on the accuracy of your answer. You have several options
and the wider the interval you select, the less you are paid if you are correct.
If you state that your guess was the exact number of red rectangles and you are right, you will
get paid $33, but if you are wrong you will earn $0.
If you state that your guess was within +/- 1 and you are right, you are paid $30, but if you
are wrong you will be paid $0.
If you state that your guess was within +/- 2 and you are right, you are paid $27, but if you
are wrong you will be paid $0.
Each consecutive row has a wider interval and a lower payment. The next to last option is:
If you state that your guess was within +/- 9 and you are right, you are paid $6, but if you are
wrong you will be paid $0.
The last option is a guaranteed payment of $3 which you get regardless of how accurate your
guess is.
After you answer this question, you will start with another counting task with a new display
of 100 rectangles and go through the same steps for a total of 10 periods.
Payment for Part I
A period will be randomly chosen from Part I of the experiment for your payoff.
Part II
Part two of the experiment is composed of 10 trivia questions. For each trivia question you
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answer correctly you will receive $1, if you answer the question incorrectly you will receive $0.
Hence, if you answer all 10 questions correctly you will receive $10.
After you have answered all 10 questions you will be asked to state the probability for each of
the 11 possible scores (0 correct - 10 correct) you may have received. You can enter any numbers
you want, but the total must equal 100%. For instance, you can enter the probabilities as shown in
the table below. Your payoff for this task will be calculated using the following formula: Payoff =
1 + r - w. Where, r is equal to 2 times the probability of the correct answer. In the table below, if
the correct answer was 5 then r = 2 x .25% = $.5. Whereas w is the sum of all squared probabilities
you enter w =

Pi=10
i=0

p2i which in this case would be w = (.02 + .02 + .102 + .202 + .202 + .252 +

.052 + .152 + .052 + .02 + .02 ) = $1.07. So if these were your choices your payoff would equal:
Payoff = 1 + .5 1.07 = $0.47.
Correct Questions
Number of Correct Questions
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Probability
0%
0%
10%
20%
20%
25%
5%
15%
5%
0%
0%

This formula may appear complicated, but what it means for you is very simple: You get paid
the most when you honestly report your best guesses about the likelihood of each of the different
possible outcomes. The range of your payoffs is from $0 to $2 for your guess.
Payment for Part II
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You will get paid $1 for each correct question plus the payment for predicting your score.
Part III
In this part you are allocated $25 and you will choose to play one of the five lotteries shown
below. Once you choose a lottery, a die will be rolled and if the die rolls 1, 2, or 3 you will be paid
event A if the die rolls a 4, 5, or 6 you will be paid event B.
Lotteries
Lottery
1
2
3
4
5
6

Event
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail
Head
Tail

Probability of the event
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%
50%

Payoff
-$16.00
-$16.00
-$18.10
-$13.50
-$19.00
-$12.20
-$20.00
-$10.75
-$22.00
-$8.10
-$23.00
-$7.25

Payment for Part III
You will get paid based on the lottery you choose.
Part IV
In this part you will be entered in a lottery and you may lose all your earnings, excluding
your $5 show-up fee. You will have the option to buy insurance to cover for the possible loss.
You will make three decisions for this part and one of these decisions will be randomly chosen for
your final payment. The probability that you lose your earnings is going to be different for each of
these decisions. You will have the option to buy insurance to cover any amount of your earnings
that you want. The insurance will be sold in units. One unit of insurance will cover $1 of your
146

earning and it will cost a given amount that will be less than or equal to $1. For example, assume
your total earnings are $30, and that the insurance cost is $.50 per unit. If you decide to not buy
any insurance with some probability p you will earn $0 and with probability 1- p you will earn
$30. If you choose to buy 15 units of insurance to cover $15 then you will pay $7.5 (15 x $.50
= $7.50) for the insurance. Then with probability (1 - p) you will earn $22.5 ($30 - $7.50) and
with probability p you will earn $7.50 ($15 you covered $7.50 the cost of insurance). Note: you
can buy any amount of insurance you want. In the example above you can buy up to 30 units of
insurance. Also, you do not need to buy the full unit of your insurance you can buy parts of the
unit. For instance, if you want to cover $23.32 you can buy 23.32 units of insurance which would
cost you $11.66 (23.32 x $.50).

Decision One
For this decision the probability (p) of loss is determined from your performance in the trivia
questions you answered in Part II and will be equal to: the number of incorrect answers divided
by 10. The more incorrect questions you answer the higher the probability that you will lose your
earnings. For instance, if you answered 4 out 10 questions incorrectly then there will be a 40%
chance that you will lose your earnings, but if you answered 8 out of 10 questions incorrectly there
will only be an 80% chance that you lose your earnings.
Decision Two
For this decision you will be told what the probability (p) of loss and the price per unit of
insurance and will be asked to make a decision on how much of your earnings you want to cover.
Decision Three
147

For this decision you will be told what the probability (p) of loss and the price per unit of
insurance and will be asked to make a decision on how much of your earnings you want to cover.
Part V
In this part you will answer some demographic questions.
Questions and Survey
Trivia Questions
Subsets of 10 trivia questions were pulled from the trivia questions below.

1. On what continent is France located?
2. What geographical area was once referred to as “Seward’s Folly?”
3. Where in the human body is food digested?
4. What is the real name of the artist who once went by the pseudonyms “Puffy”, “Puff Daddy”,
and “P. Diddy”?
5. Who is considered “The King” of rock?
6. What sport does Oscar De LaHoya participate in?
7. The pop star known for such songs as Like a Virgin, Material Girl, and Like a Prayer, goes
by what single name (rather than a first and last name)?
8. What city’s NFL team is known as the Vikings?
9. Who was the first African American to win an Academy Award for best actress?
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10. The study of the structural and functional changes in cells, tissues and organs that underlie
disease is called what?
11. J.K. Rowling’s books tell about a young wizard named Harry who goes to a school called
Hogwarts. What is Harry’s last name?
12. What state do the Yankees play for?
13. Baghdad is the capital of what middle-eastern country?
14. Who wrote and directed Kill Bill Volumes 1 and 2?
15. What band was Justin Timberlake in?
16. Laudanum is a form of what drug?

CRT Questions

1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost (in cents)?
2. It takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets. How many minutes would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets (enter a numeric value)?
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many days would it take for the patch to cover half
of the lake (enter a numeric value)?
4. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12
days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together?
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5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many
students are in the class?
6. A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90.
How much has he made?
7. Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon,
from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon
has:

(a) broken even in the stock market
(b) is ahead of where he began
(c) has lost money

Optimism Bias Questions

1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the best.

(a) Strongly disagree
(b) Disagree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Agree
(e) Strongly Agree
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2. If something can go wrong for me, it will.

(a) Strongly disagree
(b) Disagree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Agree
(e) Strongly Agree

3. I’m always optimistic about my future.

(a) Strongly disagree
(b) Disagree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Agree
(e) Strongly Agree

4. I hardly ever expect things to go my way.

(a) Strongly disagree
(b) Disagree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Agree
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(e) Strongly Agree

5. I rarely count on good things happening to me.

(a) Strongly disagree
(b) Disagree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Agree
(e) Strongly Agree

6. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad.

(a) Strongly disagree
(b) Disagree
(c) Neither agree nor disagree
(d) Agree
(e) Strongly Agree

Probability Questions

1. Suppose you flip a fair coin, meaning that the probability of heads is 0.5 and the probability
of tails is 0.5. Suppose you flip the coin twice. If the first time that you flip the coin it comes
up heads, what is the probability that it will be heads on the second flip?
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2. Suppose that the probability that Ken shows up to work in a green shirt on any given day is
0.3 and that the probability that Jill shows up to work in a green shirt on any given day is
0.4. Assuming that Ken and Jill do not coordinate the shirts that they wear to work on any
given day, what is the probability of both Ken and Jill showing up to work in green shirts on
the same day?
3. Suppose that the probability that a pregnant pig gives birth to one pig is 0.2 and the probability that she gives birth to two pigs is 0.8. The expected number of pigs that the pregnant
pig will give birth to is?
4. Suppose that the probability of rain tomorrow is 0.3. On days when it rains, the probability
of 1 inch of rainfall is 0.5, the probability of 2 inches of rainfall is 0.3, and the probability of
3 inches of rainfall is 0.2. The expected amount of rainfall tomorrow is?

Risk Question
How do you see yourself? Are you a person who is generally willing to take risks, or do you try
to avoid taking risks? Please indicate your answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where a 0 means ”not
at all willing to take risks,” and a 10 means ”very willing to take risks.” You can use the values in
between to indicate where you fall on the scale.
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Survey

1. Gender

(a) Male
(b) Female

2. Age
3. How much trading experience do you have?

(a) None
(b) Some
(c) Average
(d) More than average
(e) Professional

4. How many Math and Statistics classes have you taken?
5. Education Level

(a) High School or GED
(b) Some College
(c) Undergraduate Degree

154

(d) Master’s Degree
(e) Ph.D. Degree

Graphs and Tables
Poisson Distribution
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Table 2: Overconfidence and Insurance
The dependent variable is the percentage of total earnings that is insured.
Unknown
Known
Difference Between
Probability Treatment Probability Treatment
Treatments
Trivia Overestimation -0.047**
-0.043**
-0.026
-0.26
-0.023
-0.021
[0.015]
[0.016]
[0.015]
[0.015]
[0.015]
[0.017]
Survey Risk
-0.037**
-0.043***
0.006
[0.013]
[0.013]
[0.014]
Men
-0.031
-0.006
-0.033
[0.055]
[0.054]
[0.051]
Age
0.012
0.000
0.012
[0.009]
[0.008]
[0.009]
Math & Stat Classes
0.013
-0.009
0.021
[0.012]
[0.012]
[0.016]
Degree
-0.091
-0.021
-0.072**
[0.049]
[0.055]
[0.032]
-0.004
0.005
-0.007
CRT
[0.022]
[0.022]
[0.020]
Optimism Score
-0.006
-0.007
-0.001
[0.008]
[0.007]
[0.006]
Probability Score
0.048
0.002
0.052*
[0.035]
[0.034]
[0.031]
Treatment Order
0.014
0.006
[0.032]
[0.034]
0.001
0.001
Probabiltiy of Loss
[0.001]
[0.002]
Constant
0.506***
0.400
-0.469***
0.666**
0.037
-0.259
[0.026]
[0.267]
[0.026]
[0.216]
[0.026]
[0.240]
R-squared
0.065
0.165
0.016
0.108
0.016
0.081
109∓
109
109
109
109
109
Observations
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a participant has taken.
Degree is a variable that goes from one for High School Diploma or GED and CRT to five for a
Doctorate Degree. CRT is the number of correct CRT questions. Optimism Score is based on the
answers to the six questions from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Probability Score is
the number of correct probability qustions. Treatment Order is the order in which the decision was
made for that treatment. Lastly, Probability of Loss is the probability of loss the subject faced
when making a decision. ∓: the number of subjects is different from the original regressions because
the risk survey question was added after the first session.
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Table 3: Trivia Overestimation and Risk Preferences
The dependent variable is the overconfidence variable based on trivia questions.
Incentivized Risk Measure Survey Risk Measure
Risk
0.118
0.070
0.036
0.016
[0.100]
[0.098]
[0.077]
[0.019]
Men
0.183
0.018
[0.296]
[0.341]
0.070
0.028
Age
[0.044]
[0.044]
Math & Stat Classes
-0.117*
-0.094
[0.059]
[0.068]
-0.428
-0.310
Degree
[0.251]
[0.326]
0.050
0.020
CRT
[0.096]
[0.108]
Optimism Score
0.028
0.006
[0.041]
[0.053]
Probability Score
0.155
0.169
[0.204]
[0.217]
Constant
-0.088
-1.198
-0.078
-0.002
[0.263]
[1.354]
[0.456]
[1.272]
R-squared
0.016
0.087
0.002
0.042
124
124
109
109
Observations
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a
participant has taken. Degree is a variable that goes from one for High School
Diploma or GED and CRT to five for a Doctorate Degree. CRT is the number
of correct CRT questions. Optimism Score is based on the answers to the six
questions from the Global Preference Survey. Probability Score is the number
of correct probability qustions.
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Table 4: Overestimation and Risk Preferences
The dependent variable is the overconfidence variable based on the counting task.
Incentivized Risk Measure Survey Risk Measure
Risk
0.335
0.431
0.376
0.249
[0.308]
[0.316]
[0.261]
[0.261]
Men
1.257
1.007
[0.985]
[1.086]
0.108
0.199
Age
[0.142]
[0.135]
Math & Stat Classes
-0.182
-0.089
[0.194]
[0.213]
0.491
-0.355
Degree
[0.718]
[0.802]
-0.553
-0.595
CRT
[0.327]
[0.348]
Optimism Score
0.010
-0.037
[0.118]
[0.154]
Probability Score
-1.029
-0.875
[0.118]
[0.707]
Constant
-0.075
-1.969
-1.288
-1.650
[0.859]
[3.459]
[1.684]
[3.891]
R-squared
0.011
0.123
0.019
0.118
124
123
109
109
Observations
Standard errors given in brackets. *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Note: Math & Stat Classes is the number of math and statistics classes a
participant has taken. Degree is a variable that goes from one for High School
Diploma or GED and CRT to five for a Doctorate Degree. CRT is the number
of correct CRT questions. Optimism Score is based on the answers to the six
questions from the Global Preference Survey. Probability Score is the number
of correct probability qustions.
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5

Conclusion

This dissertation explores the effects overconfidence has on economic decision making. Chapter 1
of this dissertation explores the effect alcohol has on overconfidence and several other tasks. In
this experiment half of the subjects were treated with alcohol aimed to achieve a BAC of 0.08 and
the other half were not given any alcohol. The results from this chapter show that overconfidence
and the decisions on the other tasks were not affected by alcohol. In addition to this the
relationship between overconfidence and the other tasks is also explored in this chapter. I find no
evidence that overconfidence is statistically significantly correlated with the decisions in the other
tasks including several risk tasks.
Chapter 2 presents an experiment designed to establish a causal link between overconfidence and
trading behavior. In the experiment presented in Chapter 2 subjects trade assets, whose value was
either zero or 100 tokens with equal chance, in a double auction computerized market. Subjects
received a signal about the value of the asset. The accuracy of this signal depended on their ability
in a task they completed before each trading period. A between subject design with three
conditions is implemented in this experiment. The only thing that changes among conditions is
the information subjects have about the accuracy of their information. In the baseline condition
subjects only receive the signal, in the next condition subjects in addition the signal receive the
accuracy of the signal and in the last condition subjects also know the accuracy of the signals of
all group members. Overconfident subjects trade significantly more assets in the baseline
condition but not in any of the other two conditions. This shows that that there exists a causal
relationship between overconfidence and trading volume.
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In Chapter 3 I explore the role overconfidence has on insurance purchasing decisions. The
experiment presented in this chapter composed of a three treatment and uses a within subject
design. Subjects made decisions to purchase insurance to protect their earnings in two treatments
that were identical with the exception of what information subjects had about the probability of
loss which was the same. In one treatment subjects were told the probability of loss depended on
their performance on a trivia task and in the other treatment subjects knew the probability of loss.
Exploring the difference in decisions between these two treatments I show that there exists a
causal relationship between overconfidence and insurance purchasing decisions. The third
treatment was designed to check if subjects responded to changes in probability and the results
confirm this. In addition to this the experiment was designed to explore the stability of different
overconfidence measures and the relationship between overconfidence and risk. I find that
different tasks elicit different overconfidence measures which has implications about future and
current research. I also find that risk preferences and overconfidence are not statistically
significantly correlated.
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